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Abstract	
	
Economic,	financial	and	social	commentators	from	all	directions	and	of	various	persuasions	
are	obsessed	with	the	prospect	of	recovery.	The	world	remains	mired	in	a	deep,	prolonged	
crisis,	and	the	key	question	seems	to	be	how	to	get	out	of	it.	The	purpose	of	our	paper	is	to	
ask	 a	 very	different	 question	 that	 few	 if	 any	 seem	 concerned	with:	 can	 capitalists	 afford	
recovery	in	the	first	place?	The	article	contextualizes	and	examines	this	question	from	the	
viewpoint	of	economic	policy.	The	analysis	is	divided	into	three	parts.	The	first	part	deals	
with	 the	mainstream	macroeconomic	 perspective.	 This	 approach	 claims	 to	 have	 already	
solved	all	the	theoretical	riddles,	so	the	main	emphasis	here	is	on	the	practical	question	of	
how	to	engineer	a	recovery.	The	second	part	deals	with	the	Marxist	view.	Marxists	stress	the	
inherent	contradictions	of	accumulation,	so	the	question	for	them	is	the	very	possibility	of	
sustained	growth.	The	third	and	final	part	 takes	the	view	of	capital	as	power.	Capitalized	
power	 hinges	 not	 on	 growth,	 but	 on	 strategic	 sabotage.	 So	 from	 this	 viewpoint,	 the	 key	
question	 is	not	how	capitalists	can	achieve	and	sustain	a	 recovery,	but	whether	 they	can	
afford	it	to	start	with.	
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conomic,	 financial	 and	 social	 commentators	 from	 all	 directions	 and	 of	 various	
persuasions	are	obsessed	with	the	prospect	of	recovery.	The	world	remains	mired	in	a	
deep,	 prolonged	 crisis,	 and	 the	 key	 question	 seems	 to	 be	 how	 to	 get	 out	 of	 it.	 The	
purpose	of	our	paper	is	to	ask	a	very	different	question	that	few	if	any	seem	concerned	
with:	can	capitalists	afford	recovery	in	the	first	place?	
	
Our	 starting	 point	 is	 very	 different	 from	 the	 conventional	 creed,	 both	 mainstream	 and	
heterodox	(Nitzan	and	Bichler	2009a;	Bichler	and	Nitzan	2012b).	Liberals	and	Marxists	see	
capital	as	an	economic	entity	and	capitalism	as	a	mode	of	production	and	consumption,	so	for	
them,	the	accumulation	crisis	is	anchored	in	the	economics	of	production	and	consumption.	
By	contrast,	we	see	capital	as	a	symbolic	representation	of	power	and	capitalism	as	a	mode	of	
power,	 so	 for	 us,	 the	 crisis	 of	 accumulation	 is	 a	 crisis	 of	 capitalized	 power.	 Furthermore,	
whereas	 the	 economic	 viewpoint,	 particularly	 the	 Marxist,	 sees	 the	 current	 crisis	 as	 the	
symptom	 and	 culmination	 of	 a	 long	 process	 of	 weakening	 accumulation,	 for	 us	 it	 is	 the	
consequence	 of	 capital	 having	 reached	 unprecedented	 strength	 (Bichler	 and	 Nitzan	 2008,	
2009;	Nitzan	and	Bichler	2009b;	Bichler	and	Nitzan	2010;	Kliman,	Bichler,	and	Nitzan	2011).	
	
According	to	our	research,	the	accumulation	of	capital‐read‐power	might	be	approaching	its	
asymptotes,	 or	 limits	 (Bichler	 and	 Nitzan	 2012a).	 The	 closer	 capitalized	 power	 is	 to	 its	
asymptotes,	the	more	difficult	it	is	to	augment	it	further.	Capitalists,	though,	have	no	choice.	
They	are	conditioned	and	compelled	to	increase	their	capitalized	power	without	end,	and	that	
relentless	drive	breeds	 conflict.	 It	 forces	 capitalists	 to	 increase	 their	 threats,	 escalate	 their	
sabotage	and	intensify	their	use	of	force	–	and	this	intensification	is	in	turn	bound	to	trigger	
stronger	resistance,	contestations,	uprisings	and	more.		
	
By	the	early	2000s,	capitalists	began	to	realize	the	unfolding	of	this	asymptotic	scenario.	They	
started	to	sense	that	their	power	is	nearing	its	limits	and	that	accumulation	is	becoming	ever	
more	 difficult	 to	 achieve	 and	might	 be	 reversed.	 And	 given	 that	 capitalization	 is	 forward‐
looking,	the	result	has	been	a	major	bear	market.	Measured	in	constant	dollars,	stock	prices	
are	still	below	their	peak	levels	of	fifteen	years	ago:	in	August	2014,	the	Datastream	World	
Index	was	still	2	per	cent	shy	of	its	1999	level,	while	the	U.S.	S&P	500	was	14	per	cent	lower.		
	
The	present	paper	contextualizes	and	examines	this	process	from	the	viewpoint	of	economic	
policy.	 Thematically,	 the	 analysis	 is	 divided	 into	 three	 parts.	 The	 first	 part	 deals	with	 the	
mainstream	macroeconomic	perspective.	This	approach	claims	to	have	already	solved	the	key	
theoretical	riddles,	so	the	main	emphasis	here	is	on	the	practical	question	of	how	to	engineer	
a	 recovery.	 The	 answer	 to	 this	 question,	 though,	 remains	 elusive.	 The	 recent	 crisis	 has	
undermined	the	self‐confidence	of	policymakers:	they	are	no	longer	certain	of	their	theoretical	
models,	they	mistrust	their	policy‐tools,	and	they	feel	increasingly	short	on	policy	ammunition.	
The	second	part	examines	 the	Marxist	view.	Marxists	 stress	 the	 inherent	 contradictions	of	
E	
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accumulation,	 so	 the	 question	 for	 them	 is	 the	 very	 possibility	 of	 sustained	 growth.	 This	
approach	 offers	 very	 important	 insights,	 but	 its	 application	 to	 contemporary	 capitalism	 is	
hampered	by	conceptual	quandaries	and	empirical	inconsistencies.	Mainstream	and	Marxist	
economics	obviously	are	very	different	from	each	other	in	framework	and	goals.	Nonetheless,	
they	 share	 a	 common	 premise:	 they	 both	 consider	 capitalism	 a	 mode	 of	 production	 and	
consumption.	From	this	common	viewpoint,	crises,	although	sometimes	trigged	and	further	
complicated	by	financial,	political	and	societal	factors,	are	ultimately	about	the	‘real	economy’.	
The	third	and	final	part	challenges	this	common	premise	by	taking	the	view	that	capital	is	not	
a	 ‘real’	 productive	 entity	 but	 commodified	 power,	 and	 that	 capitalism	 is	 not	 a	 mode	 of	
production	and	consumption	but	a	mode	of	power.	Capitalized	power,	we	argue,	hinges	not	on	
growth,	but	on	strategic	sabotage.	So	from	this	viewpoint,	the	key	question	to	ask	is	not	how	
capitalists	can	achieve	and	sustain	a	recovery,	but	whether	they	can	afford	it	to	start	with.	Our	
answer	to	this	question	is	negative,	at	least	for	the	United	States.	We	show	that,	contrary	to	
popular	conviction,	over	the	past	century	the	U.S.	capitalist	income	share‐read‐power	thrived	
not	on	prosperity	and	the	growth	of	employment	but	on	crisis	and	rising	unemployment.	U.S.	
policymakers	therefore	are	locked	into	a	conceptual	and	practical	corner:	if	they	act	on	their	
conventional	belief	and	boost	 the	capitalist	 income	share	to	trigger	economic	growth,	 they	
would	achieve	the	very	opposite	result;	and	if	they	manage	to	rekindle	growth,	they	would	end	
up	undermining	the	accumulation‐read‐power	of	capitalists.		
	
Mainstream	Macroeconomics	
	
The	stock	market	crash	of	2008	and	the	ensuing	Great	Recession	heighted	the	systemic	fear	of	
the	ruling	class	–	the	sense	that	capitalism	itself	might	be	in	danger	and	that	they,	the	rulers,	
might	be	losing	their	grip	over	the	situation	(Bichler	and	Nitzan	2010;	Kliman,	Bichler,	and	
Nitzan	2011).	The	quotes	in	Box	1	suggest	that	this	fear	continues	unabated.	In	2008,	former	
Fed	Chairperson	Alan	Greenspan	spoke	of	himself	and	his	 like	being	 in	a	state	of	 ‘shocked	
disbelief’	after	their	‘whole	intellectual	edifice’	had	collapsed,	while	journalist	Gillian	Tett	of	
the	 Financial	 Times	 described	 a	 sense	 of	 total	 confusion,	 as	 capitalists,	 policymakers	 and	
smaller	 investors	 realized	 that	 their	 ‘intellectual	 compass’	 had	 been	 broken.	 The	 next	 five	
years	have	done	little	to	ease	this	systemic	fear.	In	2013,	central	bankers	admitted	quite	openly	
that	 they	 have	 no	 clue	 as	 to	 what	 is	 going	 on	 –	 or,	 in	 their	 own	words,	 that	 they	 are	 in	
‘uncharted	territory’	which	they	do	not	‘fully	understand’,	and	that	they	are	‘flying	blind	when	
steering	their	economies’.	In	that	same	year,	Lawrence	Summers,	a	former	Treasury	Secretary	
and	 until	 recently	 a	 keen	 promoter	 of	 neoliberalism,	wondered	whether	 stagnation	might	
prove	to	be	the	‘new	normal’,	while	in	2014,	Nobel	Laureate	Edmund	Phelps,	an	unrelenting	
proponent	of	free	markets,	conjured	up	the	spectre	of	‘regulation’	and	‘corporatist	values’	to	
explain	why,	despite	neoliberalism,	capitalism	has	lost	its	‘past	dynamism’.	
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Box	1	
Systemic	Fear	
	
Alan	Greenspan:	
	
The	whole	intellectual	edifice	.	.	.	collapsed	in	the	summer	of	last	year.	.	.	.	[T]hose	of	us	
who	have	 looked	 to	 the	self‐interest	of	 lending	 institutions	 to	protect	 shareholder’s	equity	
(myself	especially)	are	in	a	state	of	shocked	disbelief.	Such	counterparty	surveillance	is	a	
central	pillar	of	our	financial	markets’	state	of	balance.	If	it	fails,	as	occurred	this	year,	market	
stability	is	undermined	(Andrews	2008;	U.S.	Congress	2008,	emphases	added).	
	
Financial	Times	Editorial:	
	
Uncertainty	 is	 the	only	certain	 thing	 in	 this	crisis.	 .	 .	 .	 a	dense	 fog	of	 confusion	has	 .	 .	 .	
descended,	obscuring	where	we	are	–	falling	fast,	slowly,	bumping	along	the	bottom,	or	finally	
turning	the	corner.	.	.	.	Economies	are	behaving	unpredictably	and	will	continue	to	do	so.	The	
instability	is	both	cause	and	consequence	of	the	great	uncertainty	that	has	been	spreading	out	
from	the	financial	markets.	Fearful	and	confused,	people	react	erratically	to	changing	news,	
reinforcing	 confused	 market	 behaviour.	 It	 doesn’t	 help	 that	 our	 economic	 theories	 were	
constructed	for	a	different	world.	Most	models	depict	economies	close	to	equilibrium.	.	.	.	And	
unlike	what	most	models	assume,	prices	are	not	properly	clearing	all	markets.	 .	 .	 .	 (Editors	
2009,	emphasis	added).	
	
Gillian	Tett:	
	
[T]he	pillars	of	faith	on	which	this	new	financial	capitalism	were	built	have	all	but	collapsed,	
and	that	collapse	has	left	everyone	from	finance	minister	or	central	banker	to	small	investor	
or	 pension	 holder	 bereft	 of	 an	 intellectual	 compass,	 dazed	 and	 confused	 (Tett	 2009,	
emphasis	added).	
	
Chris	Giles:	
	
[Some]	 of	 the	 leading	 figures	 in	 central	 banking	 conceded	 they	were	 flying	blind	when	
steering	 their	 economies.	 Lorenzo	 Bini	 Smaghi,	 the	 former	 member	 of	 the	 European	
Central	Bank’s	executive	board,	captured	the	mood	at	the	IMF’s	spring	meeting,	saying:	‘We	
don’t	fully	understand	what	is	happening	in	advanced	economies’.	In	this	environment	
of	uncertainty	about	the	way	economies	work	and	how	to	influence	recoveries	with	policy,	
Sir	Mervyn	King,	the	outgoing	governor	of	the	Bank	of	England,	said	that	‘there	is	the	risk	of	
appearing	to	promise	too	much	or	allowing	too	much	to	be	expected	of	us’.	.	.	.	The	central	
bankers	were	clear	that	they	had	got	it	wrong	before	the	crisis,	allowing	themselves	to	be	
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lulled,	by	stable	inflation,	into	thinking	they	had	eliminated	financial	vulnerabilities.	.	.	.	The	
question	now	was	whether	central	bankers	are	making	the	same	mistake	in	their	efforts	to	
secure	 a	 recovery.	 Might	 they	 be	 storing	 up	 financial	 distortions	 that	 will	 bite	 in	 the	
future?.	.	.	.	‘Put	simply,	we	are	in	uncharted	territory’,	said	[vice	chairman	of	the	Federal	
Reserve]	Mr	Viñals.	.	.	.	The	problem	outlined	by	Sir	Mervyn	was	that	the	uncertainty	is	so	
pervasive	that	no	one	can	be	sure	that	the	expansionary	monetary	policy	is	appropriate	in	a	
world	where	nations	are	learning	they	are	poorer	than	they	expected,	but	are	not	sure	by	
how	 much.	 How	 can	 we	 be	 sure	 ‘we	 really	 are	 [not]	 running	 the	 risk	 of	 reigniting	 the	
problems	that	led	to	the	financial	crisis	in	the	first	place?’	Mr	Bean	asked	the	IMF	panel	(Giles	
2013,	emphases	added).		
	
Lawrence	Summers:	
	
Why	stagnation	might	prove	to	be	the	new	normal:	In	the	past	decade,	before	the	crisis,	
bubbles	and	loose	credit	were	only	sufficient	to	drive	moderate	growth.	 .	 .	 .	Is	it	possible	
that	the	US	and	other	major	global	economies	might	not	return	to	full	employment	and	
strong	 growth	 without	 the	 help	 of	 unconventional	 policy	 support?.	 .	 .	 .	 [T]he	
presumption	that	normal	economic	and	policy	conditions	will	return	at	some	point	cannot	
be	maintained	(Summers	2013,	emphases	added).	
	
Edmund	Phelps:	
	
Lethargic	 growth,	 widespread	 job	 dissatisfaction	 and	 staggering	 debt	 –	 such	 is	 life	 in	 a	
western	world	that	seems	to	have	lost	the	habit	of	innovation	that	energised	it	for	more	than	
a	century.	.	.	.	It	is	urgent	that	these	nations	find	a	way	back	to	their	past	dynamism.	.	.	.	The	
blame	 for	 the	 losses	of	 innovation	behind	 slowdowns	 in	productivity	 lies	with	 the	
spread	of	corporatist	values,	particularly	solidarity,	security	and	stability.	Politicians	
have	 introduced	 regulation	 that	 stifles	 competition;	 patronised	 interest	 groups	 through	
pork‐barrel	contracts;	and	 lent	direction	to	the	economy	through	 industrial	policy.	 In	 the	
process	 they	 have	 impeded	 those	who	would	 innovate	 or	 reduce	 their	 incentives	 to	 try	
(Phelps	2014,	emphasis	added).	
	
The	Great	Slide	
	
What	underpins	this	systemic	 fear?	Why	does	the	ruling	class	 feel	 ‘bereft	of	an	 intellectual	
compass’?	Why	do	policymakers	admit	that	they	are	‘flying	blind’?	Why	do	the	ideologues	of	
neoliberalism	 resign	 themselves	 to	 the	 ‘new	 normal’	 of	 secular	 stagnation	 and	 lost	
‘dynamism’?	
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Figure	1	
Annual	GDP	Growth	
2000‐2013	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
NOTE:	Series	show	quarterly	data,	measuring	the	year‐on‐year	
growth	rates	of	GDP	‘volumes’.	The	last	data	points	are	2013:Q4	
for	the	developing	&	emerging	countries	and	for	the	world	as	a	
whole,	and	2014:Q2	for	the	advanced	countries.	
	 	
SOURCE:	IMF	International	Financial	Statistics	through	Global	
Insight	(series	codes:	L99BP&X@C001	for	world	GDP	growth,	
L99BP&X@C110	for	GDP	growth	of	the	advanced	countries,	and	
L99BP&X@C200	for	GDP	growth	of	the	developing	&	emerging	
countries).	
	
Figure	1	provides	the	broad	context.	The	chart	is	a	snapshot	of	the	‘state	of	the	world	economy’	
since	the	beginning	of	the	systemic	crisis	in	the	early	2000s.	The	figure	shows	three	annual	
GDP	growth	rates:	(1)	the	dotted	red	line	is	for	the	advanced	countries,	(2)	the	dashed	line	is	
for	the	developing	world,	and	(3)	the	solid	line	is	for	the	world	as	a	whole.	We	can	see	the	first	
downturn	in	2000‐2002.	The	developing	world	and	emerging	markets	recovered	briskly	from	
this	decline,	but	the	advanced	countries	showed	a	very	feeble	recovery.	Then	came	the	2008‐
9	drop.	This	downturn	was	much	more	serious	(–5	per	cent	for	the	developed	world	and	–3	
per	cent	for	the	world	as	a	whole),	and	the	recovery	from	it	limited	and	brief.	By	2010,	both	
regions	–	and	the	world	as	whole	–	began	to	decelerate	rapidly.	
	
Policymakers	looking	at	this	chart	must	get	the	shivers.	Despite	massive	policy	intervention	
–	including	unorthodox	measures	that	only	a	few	years	back	would	have	been	considered	
unthinkable	 –	 the	world	 economy	has	 been	 largely	 unresponsive.	 In	 2013,	 the	 advanced	
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countries	 showed	a	modest	uptick,	but	growth	soon	decelerated,	and	many	now	 fear	 the	
uptick	was	a	‘dead	cat	bounce’.		
	 	
The	Real/Nominal	Dichotomy	
	
To	understand	 the	gravity	of	 the	 situation	 for	policymakers,	 and	 for	 the	 ruling	 class	more	
broadly,	 it	 is	 useful	 to	 provide	 some	 theoretical	 background.	 Consider	 the	 simple	
decomposition	offered	in	Equation	1:	
	
1. deflatorGDPnominalGDPrealGDPnominal  	
	
or,	
	
PQY  	
	
The	equation	starts	with	the	total	dollar	value,	or	nominal	value	of	GDP	(which	we	call	Y).	This	
value	is	the	product	of	two	components:	the	quantity	of	commodities	being	produced,	which	
economists	call	‘real’	GDP	(denoted	as	Q	in	the	equation),	and	the	average	nominal	or	dollar	
price	 of	 those	 commodities,	 which	 is	 given	 by	 the	 GDP	 deflator	 (and	marked	 by	P	 in	 the	
equation).		
	
This	decomposition,	which	goes	back	to	David	Hume’s	classical	dichotomy	between	the	‘real’	
and	the	‘nominal’	spheres	of	economic	life,	underlies	the	national	accounts	everywhere.	We	
consider	this	bifurcation	to	be	deeply	problematic,	both	theoretically	and	empirically	(Nitzan	
1989;	Nitzan	and	Bichler	2009a:	Ch.	8).	But	since	most	if	not	all	economists,	both	mainstream	
and	heterodox,	seem	to	accept	the	real/nominal	duality	as	an	article	of	faith,	and	given	that	we	
are	concerned	here	with	their	views,	not	ours,	we	shall	use	it	in	this	paper	without	further	
qualification.	
	
The	Keynesian	Revolution		
	
Until	 the	 1930s,	 the	 conventional	 liberal	 dogma	 was	 that	 government	 intervention	 was	
unnecessary	 and	 harmful:	 it	 was	 unnecessary	 because	 the	 market	 mechanism	 was	 self‐
correcting,	which,	in	today’s	lingo,	means	that	real	GDP	tends	to	oscillate	near	its	optimal,	full‐
employment	value	to	begin	with;	and	it	was	harmful	because	it	led	to	distortions,	misallocation	
and	undue	 inflation	or	deflation.	Now,	although	the	pre‐1930s	economists	did	not	 think	 in	
explicitly	 macroeconomic	 terms,	 we	 can	 use	 Equation	 1	 to	 translate	 their	 argument	 into	
contemporary	jargon.	In	a	nutshell,	their	claim	was	that	government	intervention	cannot	raise	
real	GDP	(Q),	which	is	already	at	its	maximal	 level	(although	it	certainly	can	lower	it).	This	
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inability	means	that	any	intervention	can	only	inflate	or	deflate	nominal	GDP	(Y)	by	raising	or	
lowering	prices	(P).	Parenthetically,	we	should	add	here	 that	 this	view	was	also	shared	by	
Marx,	who	thought	that	a	large	state	would	undermine	accumulation	by	taxing	away	part	of	
the	surplus	value	(Baran	and	Sweezy	1966:	142‐143).		
	
The	crisis	of	the	1930s	shattered	this	belief.	A	large	chunk	of	the	labour	force	was	unemployed,	
productive	capacity	was	lying	idle	and	the	invisible	hand	did	nothing	to	put	them	back	to	work.	
This	much	was	obvious	to	anyone	who	could	see.	But	the	economists	could	see	only	through	
their	theory,	and	that	theory	asserted	that	persistent	unemployment	was	impossible.		
	
And	 that	 is	 where	 Keynes	 came	 into	 the	 picture.	 His	 great	 achievement	was	 to	 persuade	
economists	(1)	that	the	real	economy	can	get	stuck	at	less	than	full	employment;	and	(2)	that,	
in	terms	of	Equation	1,	the	government	can	remedy	the	situation	because	it	can	impact	not	
only	the	nominal	price	level	(P),	but	also	the	real	level	of	output	(Q).		
	
Keynes	identified	two	key	problems,	both	anchored	in	base	instincts.	The	first	problem	was	a	
mismatch	of	 investment	and	savings.	As	society	grows	richer,	he	argued,	 the	propensity	 to	
invest	declines	while	the	propensity	to	save	rises.	And	since	saving	and	investment	decisions	
are	made	by	different	agents,	the	result	of	this	mismatch	is	‘deficient	demand’	and	a	tendency	
for	 stagnation	and	unemployment.	The	second	problem	was	 that	 investment	decisions	are	
governed	by	the	highly	erratic	and	largely	unpredictable	‘animal	spirits’	of	investors,	which	
make	capitalism	inherently	unstable.		
	
Now,	given	that	capitalism	tends	to	stagnation	and	instability,	and	given	that	the	government	
can	affect	the	real	economy	as	well	as	prices,	it	made	sense	for	governments	to	intervene	in	
order	to	save	capitalists	–	and	capitalism	more	generally	–	from	their	own	folly.		
	
The	Keynesian	Record	
	
The	historical	record	seems	to	confirm	this	view.	Figure	2	shows	the	U.S.	rate	of	unemployment	
and	GDP	growth	since	the	late	1880s.	Unemployment	is	plotted	against	the	right‐hand	scale	
and	GDP	growth	against	the	left‐hand	scale.	The	data	are	divided	into	two	sub‐periods:	until	
1946	and	from	1946	onward.		
	
To	explain	what	we	have	done	here,	consider	the	rate	of	unemployment.	We	have	taken	the	
period	 until	 1946,	 and	 for	 this	 period	 we	 have	 computed	 the	 series	 mean	 and	 standard	
deviation.	 The	 top	 dashed	 red	 line	 is	 equal	 to	 the	 mean	 of	 the	 series	 plus	 one	 standard	
deviation	(which,	in	this	case,	adds	up	to	11.4	per	cent),	while	the	bottom	dashed	line	is	equal	
to	the	mean	minus	one	standard	deviation	(2.4	per	cent).	According	to	the	statisticians,	the	9	
per	cent	range	between	these	two	lines,	equivalent	to	two	standard	deviations,	should	contain	
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roughly	two	thirds	of	the	squared	variation	of	the	unemployment	rate	during	1886‐1946	and	
therefore	gives	us	a	rough	sense	of	the	series’	volatility	in	that	period.	The	same	procedure	has	
been	applied	to	the	period	from	1946	onwards,	and,	as	we	can	see,	the	volatility	here	is	almost	
three	times	smaller:	the	top	dashed	line	is	at	7.4	per	cent	while	the	bottom	one	is	at	4.1	per	
cent,	yielding	a	range	of	only	3.3	per	cent.	The	same	calculations	are	shown	for	the	GDP	growth	
series,	and	here,	too,	we	can	see	a	marked	decline	in	volatility	between	the	two	periods.	
	
	
Figure	2	
U.S.	Unemployment	and	GDP	Growth	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
NOTE:	GDP	growth	is	the	annual	rate	of	change	of	GDP	in	
constant	prices.	The	unemployment	rate	is	expressed	as	a	share	
of	the	labour	force.	The	last	data	points	are	2013	for	GDP	
growth	and	2014	for	the	unemployment	rate.	
	 	
SOURCE:	Global	Financial	Data	(series	codes:	GDPCUSA_Close	for	
GDP	in	constant	prices);	Historical	Statistics	of	the	United	States,	
Earliest	Times	to	the	Present:	Millennial	Edition	(online)	(series	
code:	
Unemployed_AsPercentageOf_CivilianLaborForce_Ba475_Per‐
cent	for	the	unemployment	rate	[till	1947]);	U.S.	Bureau	of	Labor	
Statistics	through	Global	Insight	(series	code:	RUC	for	the	
unemployment	rate,	computed	as	annual	averages	of	monthly	
data	[1948	onward]).	
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This	 record,	which	 is	probably	 representative	of	what	happened	 in	other	 countries,	 seems	
pretty	clear.	The	data	serve	to	explain	why,	during	the	early	1970s,	both	Milton	Friedman	and	
Richard	Nixon	proclaimed	that	‘we	are	all	Keynesian	now’.2	Governments	seem	to	have	learnt	
how	 to	 ‘manage’	 their	 economies.	 Not	 only	 have	 they	 prevented	 a	 repeat	 of	 the	 Great	
Depression,	 they	 have	 also	 significantly	 reduced	 the	 instability	 that	 radical	 political	
economists	had	predicted	would	shatter	capitalism.	
	
The	Monetarist	Counter‐Revolution	
	
But	that	was	also	the	problem.	The	success	of	Keynesian	‘demand	management’	meant	that	
capitalists	were	no	 longer	in	the	driver’s	seat.	 If	 they	misbehaved	–	either	by	not	 investing	
enough	or	 by	 acting	 erratically	 –	 governments	 could	 step	 in	 and	 fix	 things	 up.	Worst	 still,	
Keynesian	policymaking	could	be	pitted	against	 the	capitalists,	particularly	 through	higher	
corporate	tax	rates	and	progressive	personal	taxation.	This	is	exactly	what	happened	in	the	
United	States	after	the	Second	World	War,	with	the	result	being	that	the	national	income	share	
of	corporations	stagnated	and	the	distribution	of	personal	income	became	more	equal.	
	
In	 short,	Keynes	had	 to	be	undone,	and	 this	 is	where	Milton	Friedman	and	his	monetarist	
counter‐revolution	came	into	the	picture.	Monetarism	–	and	the	new‐classical	macroeconomic	
theories	that	developed	in	its	wake	–	claims	that	the	pre‐1930s	neoclassicists	had	it	right	all	
along.	There	were	only	two	little	things	missing	from	their	framework:	(1)	the	natural	rate	of	
unemployment	and	(2)	expectations.		
	
The	natural	rate	of	unemployment	is	like	the	Emperor’s	New	Clothes:	only	the	monetarists	and	
the	new‐classicists	can	see	it.	For	the	old,	pre‐1930s	economists,	the	basic	rule	was	‘what	you	
see	is	what	you	get’.	If	the	statistics	said	that	unemployment	was	zero	or	oscillating	close	to	
zero,	then	the	economy	must	be	functioning	as	well	as	it	should.	Alternatively,	if	the	statistics	
said	 that	unemployment	was	stuck	at	over	20	per	cent	–	as	was	 the	case	during	 the	Great	
Depression	–	 then	 the	 theory,	which	predicted	 that	unemployment	should	quickly	decline,	
must	be	wrong.		
	
Not	so	for	the	monetarists	and	new‐classical	economists.	Appearances	can	be	very	deceiving,	
they	warn	us;	particularly	if	you	are	unversed	in	new‐classical	monetarism.	But	those	who	can	
see	the	emperor’s	new	clothes	know	better.	They	know	that,	in	fact,	most	unemployment	is	
not	unemployment	at	all.	It	consists	of	people	looking	for	better	jobs,	people	upgrading	their	
skills,	or	people	who	are	temporarily	caught	in	the	friction	of	blessed	technical	change.	This	
                                                            
2	Friedman	held	onto	both	ends	of	the	stick.	‘In	some	sense’,	he	wrote	(1968a:	15),	‘we	are	all	Keynesians	now;	
in	another,	no	one	is	a	Keynesian	any	longer.	We	all	use	the	Keynesian	language	and	apparatus;	none	of	us	any	
longer	 accepts	 the	 initial	 Keynesian	 conclusions’.	 Nixon	 was	 less	 subtle,	 announcing	 that	 he	 was	 ‘now	 a	
Keynesian	in	economics’	(Anonymous	1971).	
 
 
120 
 
CAN	CAPITALISTS	AFFORD	RECOVERY?
unemployment	–	whose	precise	magnitude	can	change	with	circumstances	–	is	part	and	parcel	
of	a	vibrant,	ever‐changing	capitalism.	It	is	natural	and	therefore	desirable;	and	things	that	are	
natural	and	desirable	should	not	be	messed	with	by	government.3		
	
Government	policy	can	reduce	unemployment	below	its	natural	rate	–	but	only	by	cheating.	In	
terms	of	Equation	1,	the	monetarist	position	is	that,	if	economic	agents	have	full	information	
and	act	rationally,	the	government	can	only	affect	prices	(P).	It	cannot	affect	the	real	economy	
(Q).	Unfortunately,	though,	information	is	not	always	fully	available	and	agents	sometimes	act	
irrationally,	so	there	is	always	the	temptation	for	government	to	try	to	fool	them	in	order	to	
reduce	their	unemployment	below	its	natural	rate.		
	
The	 ‘efficacy	 of	 fooling’	 (our	 term)	 depends	 on	 expectations.	 In	 Friedman’s	 naïve	 version	
(1968b,	1977),	expectations	adapt	only	slowly,	so	unemployment	can	be	reduced	below	its	
natural	rate	for	a	certain	period	–	although	there	is	always	a	price	to	pay.	Eventually,	agents	
smarten	up;	and	when	they	do,	Equation	1	ascertains	that	the	entire	policy	boost	(through	a	
higher	Y)	ends	up	raising	prices	(P).	In	later	versions,	such	as	those	of	Robert	Lucas	(1972;	
1973;	1978)	and	Thomas	Sargent	(1973),	expectations	are	rational,	so	expansionary	policy	
cannot	affect	the	real	economy	(Q)	even	in	the	short	run	and	is	immediately	translated	into	
higher	 inflation	 (by	 raising	 P).	 A	 more	 recent	 instalment	 of	 this	 logic,	 issued	 by	 Edward	
Prescott	and	Finn	Kydland	(1982),	suggests	that	the	entire	business	cycle	is	a	natural,	supply‐
side	process	and	therefore	impervious	to	Keynesian	demand	policy	to	start	with.	
	
Friedman,	Phelps,	Lucas,	Sargent,	Kydland	and	Prescott	all	won	Nobel	Memorial	Prizes,	and	
for	a	good	reason:	they	managed	to	undo	Keynes.	They	created	a	new	dogma	that	states	not	
only	that	macroeconomic	policy	cannot	affect	the	real	economy,	but,	more	importantly,	that	
the	real	economy	does	not	need	to	be	affected	in	the	first	place.	In	their	laissez	faire	economy,	
the	rate	of	unemployment	will	settle	at	its	natural	rate,	whether	it	is	6,	8	or	20	per	cent.	The	
                                                            
3	The	language	is	definitive.	According	to	Nobel	Memorial	Prize	winner	Milton	Friedman	(1968b:	8),	 ‘At	any	
moment	 of	 time	 there	 is	 some	 level	 of	 unemployment	 which	 has	 the	 property	 that	 it	 is	 consistent	 with	
equilibrium	in	the	structure	of	real	wage	rates.	.	.	.	The	“natural	rate	of	unemployment”,	in	other	words,	is	the	
level	that	would	be	ground	out	by	the	Walrasian	system	of	general	equilibrium	equations,	provided	there	is	
embedded	in	them	the	actual	structural	characteristics	of	the	labor	and	commodity	markets,	including	market	
imperfections,	 stochastic	 variability	 in	 demands	 and	 supplies,	 the	 cost	 of	 gathering	 information	 about	 job	
vacancies	 and	 labor	 availability,	 the	 costs	 of	mobility,	 and	 so	 on’.	 For	 Edmund	Phelps,	 another	Nobelist	 of	
monetarist	repute,	a	certain	rate	of	unemployment	is	not	only	‘natural’	but	also	desirable	(provided	it	excludes	
tenured	professors,	of	course).	In	his	expert	opinion,	most	of	the	so‐called	unemployed	are	merely	‘searching’	
for	a	better	job.	‘It	would	be	as	senselessly	puritanical	to	wipe	out	unemployment	as	it	would	be	to	raise	taxes	
in	a	deep	depression’.	There	is	nothing	to	worry	about,	he	concludes.	On	the	contrary:	‘Today’s	unemployment	
is	an	investment	in	a	better	allocation	of	any	given	quantity	of	employed	persons	tomorrow’	(1970:	17).	The	
very	 same	 point	 was	 reiterated	 by	 another	 monetarist	 of	 Nobelistic	 repute,	 Robert	 Lucas:	 ‘When	we	 are	
unemployed’,	he	observed,	‘it	is	because	we	think	we	can	do	better’	(interviewed	by	Snowdon	and	Vane	2005:	
290,	 emphases	 added).	And	 that	must	 be	 true.	 After	 all,	 it	 is	well	 known	 that	whenever	 Phelps	 and	 Lucas	
invested	in	their	own	unemployment,	they	always	ended	up	making	a	bundle.	
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only	thing	the	government	should	do	is	keep	prices	stable	over	the	longer	haul,	by	letting	the	
money	supply	grow	at	the	same	rate	as	the	long‐term	growth	of	the	real	economy.	
	
This	was	the	dogma	in	2008.	
	
And	then	came	the	stock	market	crash	and	the	Great	Recession.	Protected	by	academic	tenure	
and	 heavy	 subsidization,	 the	 economics	 profession	 has	 remained	 largely	 unfazed,	 but	 the	
policymakers	have	panicked,	in	unison.	Within	a	few	years,	they	have	lost	all	confidence	in	
their	 own	 dogma.	 Instead	 of	 sitting	 tight	 and	 letting	 the	 market	 ‘fix	 itself’,	 they	 have	
‘intervened’,	massively,	breaking	almost	every	rule	in	their	book.	
	
Fiscal	Policy	
	
On	the	fiscal	side,	policymakers	have	let	budget	deficits	skyrocket.	Figure	3	shows	the	budget	
balance	 in	 the	 OECD	 countries,	 with	 positive	 numbers	 indicating	 a	 surplus	 and	 negative	
numbers	 showing	 a	 deficit.	 We	 can	 see	 that,	 since	 the	 early	 1990s,	 with	 monetarist	
neoliberalism	in	full	swing,	deficits	tended	to	shrink,	and	that	in	some	countries	they	reverted	
to	small	surpluses.	But	the	first	crash	of	the	millennium,	in	2000,	reversed	that	trend,	and	in	
2008,	it	was	as	if	all	hell	had	broken	loose.	The	average	OECD	government	deficit	rose	to	nearly	
8	per	cent	of	GDP,	and	in	the	U.S.,	the	bastion	of	neoliberalism,	the	deficit	reached	12	per	cent.	
	
Of	 course,	 this	 was	 not	 exactly	 a	 return	 to	 Keynesianism,	 with	 its	 emphasis	 on	 planning	
through	high	taxes	and	even	higher	spending	(on	the	rise	and	decline	of	'Keynesianism'	in	the	
current	 crisis,	 see	 Farrell	 and	 Quiggin	 2012).	 Instead,	 it	 was	 a	 quick‐and‐dirty,	 ‘hands‐off	
intervention’,	based	mostly	on	tax	cuts	and	automatic	stabilizers.	And	as	we	can	see,	it	was	
hastily	 reversed.	 In	 the	 early	 2010s,	 policymakers	 started	 to	 talk	 about	 ‘austerity’,	 ‘belt	
tightening’	and	‘fiscal	cliffs’.	And	their	U‐Turn	came	not	because	their	economies	were	finally	
booming	 or	 because	 the	 economists	 had	 come	 up	with	 some	 new	 theoretical	 insight,	 but	
because	of	the	public	debt.		
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Figure	3	
Government	Budget	Balance	in	the	OECD	(%	of	GDP)	
1970‐2014	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	 	
	
	
	
	
	
NOTE:	Series	show	annual	data.	The	government	budget	balance	is	
defined	as	government	net	lending.	Positive/negative	numbers	
indicate	surplus/deficit,	respectively.	The	last	data	points	are	for	
2014.	
	
SOURCE:	OECD	StatExtracts	(series	codes:	NLGQ	for	government	
net	lending	as	a	per	cent	of	nominal	GDP).		
	
	
Figure	4	shows	the	ratio	of	government	debt	to	GDP	in	the	OECD.	With	deficits	soaring	and	
GDP	stagnating,	governments	had	to	borrow	massively,	causing	the	debt/GDP	ratio	to	rise	by	
nearly	50	per	cent	in	only	5	years!	And	with	the	ratio	currently	exceeding	110	per	cent	–	up	
from	40	per	 cent	 in	 the	1970s	–	policymakers	now	warn	us	 they	are	 running	out	of	 fiscal	
ammunition.4	
	
	 	
                                                            
4	A	recent	scandalized	version	of	this	warning	was	issued	by	Carmen	Reinhart	and	Kenneth	Rogoff,	who	claimed	
that	‘across	both	advanced	countries	and	emerging	markets,	high	debt/GDP	levels	(90	percent	and	above)	are	
associated	with	notably	lower	growth	outcomes’	(Reinhart	and	Rogoff	2010:	577).	Coming	from	top	pundits,	
this	 warning	 was	 happily	 leveraged	 in	 support	 of	 austerity	 measures,	 until	 a	 group	 of	 University	 of	
Massachusetts	 economists	 showed	 it	 to	 be	 based	 on	 faulty	 Excel	 sheet	 calculations.	 Once	 corrected,	 the	
computations	showed	debt/GDP	levels	to	have	had	no	discernable	impact	on	growth	(Herndon,	Ash,	and	Pollin	
2013).	Needless	to	say,	this	correction	has	hardly	dented	the	conviction	of	the	debt	fixers.	
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Figure	4	
Government	Debt	in	the	OECD	(%	of	GDP)	
1969‐2014	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
NOTE:	Series	show	annual	data.	Government	debt	comprises	
government	gross	financial	liabilities.	The	last	data	point	is	for	
2014.	
	 	
SOURCE:	OECD	StatExtracts	(series	code:	GGFLQ	for	general	
government	gross	financial	liabilities	as	a	percentage	of	GDP).		
	
	
Monetary	Policy	
	
The	situation	with	monetary	policy	 looks	equally	demoralizing.	Until	2008,	 the	monetarist	
mantra	spoke	about	fixed	‘policy	rules’	that	central	bankers	should	obey.	In	2008,	these	rules	
were	thrown	out	of	the	window.	Instead	of	letting	the	money	supply	grow	at	the	same	rate	as	
the	so‐called	real	economy,	central	banks	embarked	on	what	they	called	‘quantitative	easing’.	
Or,	in	simpler	words,	they	began	to	print	money,	and	in	large	quantities.		
	
This	process	is	shown	in	Figure	5.	The	graph	plots	the	monetary	base	–	which	measures	the	
amount	of	notes	and	coins	in	circulation	–	in	the	United	States,	the	European	Union	and	Japan.	
The	numbers	are	denominated	in	local	currencies	and	normalized	to	January	2008=100	so	
they	can	be	compared	easily.		
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Figure	5	
The	Monetary	Base	
2000‐2014	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
NOTE:	Series	show	monthly	data.	Original	data	are	in	local	
currencies,	rebased	to	January	2008=100.0.	The	last	data	points	
are	March	2014	for	the	U.S.	and	April	2014	for	the	EU	and	Japan.	
	 	
SOURCE:	IMF	International	Financial	Statistics	through	Global	
Insight	(series	codes:	L19MA@C111	for	the	U.S.	monetary	base);	
Bank	of	Japan	through	Global	Insight	(series	code:	JPNVM0001	for	
Japan’s	monetary	base);	European	Central	Bank	(series	code:	
ILM.M.U2.C.LT01.Z5.EUR	for	Euro	area	base	money,	changing	
composition).	
 
 
The	watershed	is	2008.	Before	2008,	the	expansion	of	the	money	supply	was	relatively	orderly,	
particularly	 in	 the	European	Union	and	 the	United	States.	This	pattern	changed	drastically	
after	the	crash,	with	the	United	States	 leading	the	way.	Since	2008,	the	U.S.	Fed	has	nearly	
quintupled	 the	 money	 supply.	 The	 European	 Central	 Bank	 quickly	 followed	 –	 though	
compared	to	the	American	‘bull	in	a	china	store’,	it	trod	carefully,	choosing	fine‐tuning	over	
indiscriminate	printing.	The	Japanese,	who	were	first	to	toy	with	this	policy	in	the	early	2000s,	
are	only	now	re‐joining	the	bandwagon:	in	early	2013	they	announced	plans	to	double	their	
monetary	base	in	two	years,	a	target	they	are	soon	to	achieve.	
	
This	massive	money	printing	is	remarkable	primarily	because	it	seems	to	have	had	little	or	no	
effect,	nominal	or	real.	Begin	with	the	nominal	side.	From	a	Keynesian	perspective,	the	deep	
crisis	 of	 2008‐9,	 should	 have	 produced	 deflation,	while,	 from	 a	monetarist	 viewpoint,	 the	
massive	 quantitative	 easing	 should	 have	 generated	 hyperinflation.	 Yet	 neither	 of	 these	
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outcomes	has	materialized.	Over	the	past	decade,	core	inflation	in	the	developed	countries	–	
that	is,	inflation	excluding	changes	in	food	and	energy	prices	–	has	remained	remarkably	stable	
at	around	1‐2	per	cent.5		
	
And	the	picture	is	equally	embarrassing	on	the	real	side.	Keynesians	had	hoped	that	making	
money	 cheaper	would	boost	 investment	 and	kick‐start	 the	 economy.	However,	 that	 hasn’t	
happened.	Since	the	beginning	of	the	crisis,	green‐field	investment	as	a	share	of	GDP	in	the	
OECD	countries	has	plummeted	to	its	lowest	level	in	50	years:	this	share	stood	at	25	per	cent	
in	the	early	1970s;	it	fell	to	21	per	cent	in	2007	and	it	currently	stands	on	18	per	cent	(World	
Bank	Online).		
	
Figure	6	
Long‐Term	Government	Bond	Yields	
1953‐2013	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	 	
	
	
	
	
	
NOTE:	Series	show	annual	data.	For	Japan,	data	prior	to	1966	are	
measured	by	the	prime	lending	rate.	The	last	data	points	are	for	
2013.	
	 	
SOURCE:	IMF	International	Financial	Statistics	through	Global	
Insight	(L60P@C158	for	Japan’s	prime	lending	rate,	L61@C158	for	
Japan’s	government	bond	yield,	L61@C111	for	U.S.	government	
bond	yield	and	L61@C134	for	Germany’s	government	bond	yield).		
                                                            
5	One	could	of	course	argue	that	quantitative	easing	helped	prevent	depression	and	deflation	and	therefore	
vindicated	 both	 the	 Keynesian	 and	 monetarist	 positions.	 Such	 counterfactual	 claims,	 though,	 although	
appeasing	to	the	policymakers,	are	inherently	irrefutable.	
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Moreover,	looking	at	Figure	6,	it	is	hard	to	see	why	Keynesians	should	have	expected	monetary	
policy	to	reverse	this	downtrend.	The	chart	shows	long‐term	government	bond	yields	in	the	
three	leading	OECD	countries.	These	rates	were	already	very	low	when	the	crisis	started,	and	
now,	 at	 close	 to	 zero,	 they	 are	 lower	 than	 at	 any	other	 time	 since	 the	1950s.	 In	 this	 case,	
printing	more	money	is	like	‘pushing	on	a	string’,	as	Keynes	reputedly	put	it.	It	should	have	
little	or	no	effect	on	interest	rates	and	therefore	none	on	real	investment.		
	
This	brief	exposition	should	make	it	clear	why	the	ruling	class	feels	bereft	of	an	intellectual	
compass	 and	 why	 its	 policymakers	 admit	 that	 they	 are	 flying	 blind	 when	 stirring	 their	
economies.	Their	dogma	has	collapsed.	Not	only	did	they	abandon	this	dogma	in	a	panic	when	
the	2008	crisis	struck,	but	their	makeshift	solutions	have	failed	to	generate	meaningful	results,	
let	alone	the	expected	ones.	Moreover,	they	seem	to	have	run	out	of	ammunition.	With	massive	
debt,	 further	 fiscal	 expansion	 becomes	 impossible;	 and	 with	 interest	 rates	 close	 to	 zero,	
monetary	expansion	is	useless.	Another	crisis	today	would	find	them	empty	handed.		
	
The	Marxist	Perspective	
	
For	 the	 Marxists,	 the	 key	 question	 is	 not	 how	 to	 bring	 about	 a	 recovery,	 but	 whether	
sustained	growth	is	possible	to	begin	with.	According	to	Marx,	the	answer	to	this	question	is	
negative.	Accumulation	for	him	is	rooted	in	and	generated	through	class	conflict,	and	this	
conflict	makes	capitalism	inherently	unstable,	prone	to	crisis	and,	eventually,	destined	for	
breakdown.	
	
Marx	himself	did	not	offer	a	coherent	theory	of	crisis.	He	did	generate,	however,	several	key	
principles	that	in	his	view	were	crucial	for	understanding	the	inherent	crisis	tendencies	of	
capitalism.	These	insights	later	gave	rise	to	a	huge	Marxist	literature	on	crises,	to	which	we	
cannot	do	justice	here.	Our	purpose,	rather,	is	simply	to	highlight	some	of	Marx’s	insights,	as	
well	as	the	difficulties	they	give	rise	to.	We	focus	on	three	theories,	which	we	will	examine	in	
turn:	(1)	the	tendency	of	the	rate	of	profit	to	fall;	(2)	the	interaction	between	the	reserve	
army	of	the	unemployed	and	the	real	wage;	and	(3)	underconsumption	(for	critical	reviews	
and	overviews	of	Marxist	 crisis	 theories,	 see,	 for	 example,	 Sweezy	1942:	Part	 III;	Wright	
1977;	Shaikh	1978;	Weisskopf	1978,	1991;	Laibman	1999‐2000;	Agnoletto	2013).	
	
The	Tendency	of	the	Rate	of	Profit	to	Fall	
	
Profit	for	Marx	is	the	source	of	accumulation.	As	a	class,	capitalists	can	only	reinvest	what	
they	appropriate	in	profit;	so	if	the	rate	of	profit	tends	to	fall,	so	must	the	maximum	rate	at	
which	capital	can	accumulate.	Now,	according	to	Marx,	and	here	we	come	to	the	first	theory,	
this	downward	tendency	is	built	into	the	very	logic	of	capitalism.		
	
 
 
127 
 
CAN	CAPITALISTS	AFFORD	RECOVERY?
To	see	why	this	is	so,	let	us	review	the	basic	Marxist	accounting	in	Equations	2‐8	below.	Begin	
with	c,	v	and	s,	which	are	measured	in	terms	of	socially	necessary	abstract	labour	time.	If	we	
denote	constant	capital	by	c,	variable	capital	by	v	and	surplus	value	by	s,	we	can	express	the	
following	three	relationships.	The	organic	composition	of	capital	θ	is	the	ratio	of	c/v;	the	rate	
of	surplus	value	ξ	is	the	ratio	of	s/v;	and	the	rate	of	profit	π	is	the	ratio	of	s/(c+v).	If	we	now	
divide	the	numerator	and	denominator	of	the	rate	of	profit	by	v,	we	can	express	the	rate	of	
profit	π	as	a	ratio	between	the	rate	of	surplus	value	ξ	and	the	organic	composition	of	capital	
θ	plus	1.6	
	
2. c	=	constant	capital	
3. v	=	variable	capital	
4. s	=	surplus	value	
5. 
v
c =	organic	composition	of	capital	
6. 
v
s =	rate	of	surplus	value	
7. 
vc
s
 =	rate	of	profit	
8. 
111  capitalofncompositioorganic
valuesurplusofrate
vc
vs
vc
s

 	
	
This	framework,	says	Marx,	enables	us	to	understand	one	of	the	key	built‐in	limitations	of	
capitalism.	Competition	compels	profit‐maximizing	capitalists	to	constantly	mechanize	their	
production,	 and	 this	 relentless	process	 causes	 the	organic	 composition	 to	 rise	over	 time.	
Capitalists	are	also	driven	to	raise	the	rate	of	surplus	value	(although	it	is	not	entirely	clear	
why,	under	competitive	conditions,	 they	should	succeed	 in	doing	so).	 In	Marx’s	opinion	–	
which	he	himself	was	never	completely	convinced	of	–	the	organic	composition	tends	to	rise,	
and	 it	 tends	 to	 rise	 faster	 than	 the	 rate	 of	 surplus	 value,	 assuming	 that	 this	 rate	 trends	
upward	as	well	(on	Marx's	life‐long	attempt	to	grapple	with	this	process,	see	Heinrich	2013;	
for	 contesting	 views,	 see	 Heinrich	 et	 al.	 2013).	 The	 progressive	 growth	 of	 the	 organic	
composition	is	offset	by	counter‐tendencies;	but	according	to	Marx,	over	the	longer‐haul	the	
former	 process	 is	 stronger,	 causing	 the	 rate	 of	 profit	 to	 trend	 downward.	 Over	 time,	
                                                            
6	There	is	a	debate	among	Marxists	on	whether	the	proper	definition	of	C	in	these	equations	should	include	(1)	
the	 entire	 stock	 of	 constant	 capital	 being	 advanced,	 or	 (2)	 only	 the	 part	 that	 is	 used	 up	 in	 producing	 the	
commodity.	 In	 our	 presentation,	 we	 bypass	 this	 debate	 by	 defining	 the	 commodity	 to	 comprise	 the	 gross	
national	product	and	 the	somewhat	depreciated	constant	capital	 that	 remains	at	 the	end	of	 the	production	
cycle,	so	C	satisfies	both	definitions	(we	are	indebted	to	Moshé	Machover	for	reminding	us	of	this	issue).	
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therefore,	 accumulation	 tends	 to	decelerate,	 crises	multiply	and	capitalism	becomes	ever	
more	difficult	to	sustain.		
	
The	problems	with	these	propositions	are	legion,	and	here	we	highlight	three	(for	a	more	
detailed	account,	see	Nitzan	and	Bichler	2009a,	Chs.	6‐8).	The	first	problem	is	with	the	unit	
of	 measurement.	 Labour	 values,	 which	 Marx’s	 variables	 are	 denominated	 in,	 cannot	 be	
observed	or	examined	directly,	making	their	empirical	inquiry	difficult	if	not	impossible.	The	
second	problem	is	that	mechanization	per	se	can	tell	us	nothing	about	labour	values.	Even	if	
we	 accept	 Marx’s	 value	 scheme,	 it	 is	 entirely	 possible	 for	 technical	 change	 to	 devalue	
constant	capital	faster	than	the	rate	at	which	capitalists	augment	their	‘physical	machinery’	
(however	measured).	If	that	happens,	the	organic	composition	will	fall	rather	than	rise.	Third	
and	finally,	for	Marx,	the	economy	is	bifurcated	into	productive	and	unproductive	activity.	
The	former	produces	surplus	value,	while	the	latter	uses	it	–	yet	there	is	no	objective	basis	
to	deciding	which	economic	activity	is	productive	and	which	is	not.		
	
The	consequences	of	this	last	problem	are	illustrated	in	Figures	7	and	8,	which	pertain	to	the	
United	States.	Since	labour	values	cannot	be	observed,	in	both	charts	we	assume	–	as	most	
Marxists	do	in	their	empirical	analysis	–	that	these	values	are	more	or	less	equal	to	market	
prices.	 Of	 course,	 if	 this	 assumption	 is	 incorrect,	 the	 estimates	 we	 present	 here	 are	
meaningless.		
	
Figure	7	takes	a	naïve	perspective.	It	is	naïve	because	in	this	chart	we	do	not	pretend	to	be	
able	to	distinguish	productive	from	unproductive	labour,	and	instead	assume,	contrary	to	
most	Marxists,	 that	all	 economic	 activity	 is	 productive	 of	 surplus	 value.	 The	 dashed	 line	
approximates	the	organic	composition	of	capital.	It	is	estimated	by	taking	the	ratio	between	
the	current	(replacement)	dollar	cost	of	all	non‐residential	fixed	assets	and	the	dollar	value	
of	employee	compensation.	The	solid	line	measures	the	Marxist	rate	of	profit,	computed	as	
the	 ratio	 of	 net	 operating	 surplus	 (which	 is	 net	 domestic	 product	 less	 employee	
compensation)	 and	 the	 sum	 of	 the	 current	 dollar	 cost	 of	 fixed	 assets	 and	 employee	
compensation.7	
	
	
	 	
                                                            
7	We	should	note	here	that	Marxists	remain	divided	on	whether	‘capital’	in	the	rate	of	profit	should	include	
both	the	physical	capital	stock	and	the	wage	bill,	so	π	=	s	/	(c	+	v),	or	only	the	physical	capital	stock,	so	π	=	s	/	c.	
Here	we	remain	true	to	Marx’s	original	formulation	(the	former),	although	using	the	latter	would	yield	the	same	
conclusions.	For	 the	United	States,	 the	 two	rate‐of‐profit	 formulas	result	 in	different	magnitudes,	but	 these	
magnitudes	correlate	tightly	in	their	long‐term	trends	and	short‐term	fluctuations.	
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Net Operating Surplus /
(Fixed Assets + Labour Income)
(left)
Fixed Assets / Labour Income
(right)
Figure	7	
Naïve	Marxist	Proxies	for	the	U.S.	Rate	of	Profit	and	
the	Organic	Composition	of	Capital	
1929‐2012	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	 	
	
	
	
	
	
NOTE:	Fixed	Assets	is	the	replacement	cost	of	private	and	
governmental	net	non‐residential	fixed	assets.	Labour	income	is	
domestic	compensation	of	employees.	Net	operating	surplus	is	net	
domestic	product	less	domestic	labour	income.	The	last	data	points	
are	for	2012.	
	
SOURCE:	U.S.	Bureau	of	Economic	Analysis	through	Global	Insight	
(series	codes:	FAPAGNRE	for	net	fixed	assets;	NDP	for	net	domestic	
product;	YDCOMP	for	domestic	compensation	of	employees).		
	
Now,	on	the	face	of	it,	the	current	crisis	seems	consistent	with	Marx’s	theory.	We	can	see	that,	
since	the	early	2000s,	the	organic	composition	has	risen	and	the	rate	of	profit	has	dropped.	
Moreover,	this	inverse	relationship	seems	to	hold	–	at	least	cyclically	–	for	the	entire	period	
since	the	1930s.		
	
Technically,	this	inverse	cyclicality	is	not	entirely	surprising.	Since	fixed	assets	appear	in	the	
numerator	of	one	ratio	(the	organic	composition)	and	the	denominator	of	the	other	(the	rate	
of	profit),	their	variations	will	cause	the	two	ratios	to	move	inversely,	by	definition.	
	
The	difficulty	with	this	figure	lies	in	the	longer‐term	trends.	The	rate	of	profit	in	the	chart	
seems	 to	 trend	downward,	 in	 line	with	Marx’s	 theory.	But	 this	decline	 is	 supposed	 to	be	
caused	 by	 a	 rising	 organic	 composition	 of	 capital,	whereas	 in	 the	 chart	 this	 composition	
seems	to	have	fallen	over	time.	In	other	words,	the	long‐term	decline	in	the	rate	of	profit	–	
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assuming	we	accept	its	definition	here	–	must	have	been	caused	by	factors	other	than	the	
organic	composition	of	capital.		
	
Now,	adherents	of	the	falling	tendency	theory	would	likely	contest	our	naïveté	here.	In	order	
to	properly	compute	the	organic	composition	and	the	rate	of	profit,	they	would	argue,	we	
must	 first	 differentiate	 between	 productive	 activity	 that	 produces	 surplus	 value	 and	
unproductive	activity	 that	uses	 surplus	value.	This,	 though,	 is	 easier	 said	 than	done.	And	
since	nobody	knows	exactly	which	labour	activity	is	productive	and	which	is	not,	Marxists	
take	a	shortcut.	They	identify	entire	sectors	that	they	deem	to	be	productive	and	separate	
them	from	all	other	sectors,	which	they	classify	as	unproductive	(see,	for	example,	Shaikh	
and	Tonak	1994;	Carchedi	2011).		
	
Figure	8	follows	this	standard	Marxist	practice.	It	identifies	four	sectors	as	the	productive	
core	 of	 the	 U.S.	 economy:	 agriculture,	 mining,	 construction	 and	 manufacturing.8	 The	
remaining	 sectors	 are	 considered	 unproductive.	 With	 this	 bifurcation,	 the	 organic	
composition	of	capital	 is	calculated	not	 for	the	economy	as	a	whole,	but	only	 for	the	four	
sectors	that	produce	surplus	value.	Part	of	this	surplus	value	is	appropriated	by	capitalists	
in	these	productive	sectors;	the	rest	is	appropriated	by	the	capitalists	and	workers	of	the	
unproductive	sectors.	To	calculate	the	overall	surplus	value	we	subtract	from	net	domestic	
income	the	wage	bill	of	the	productive	sectors.9	We	then	divide	this	surplus	value	by	the	sum	
of	the	fixed	assets	and	wages	of	the	productive	sectors,	to	get	the	rate	of	profit.	
	
Now,	unlike	in	Figure	7,	in	this	chart	the	organic	composition	trends	upward,	as	it	should	–	
but,	then,	so	does	the	rate	of	profit!	In	Marxist	terms,	this	relationship	means	that	there	are	
counter‐tendencies	 that	 more	 than	 offset	 the	 long‐term	 impact	 of	 the	 rising	 organic	
composition.	 Proponents	 of	 this	 theory	 may	 again	 contest	 that	 our	 particular	 choice	 of	
productive	 and	 unproductive	 sectors	 is	 inappropriate,	 and	 maybe	 they	 are	 right.	
Unfortunately,	 though,	 there	 is	 no	way	 to	 objectively	 delineate	 the	 two	 sectors,	 and	 this	
inability	creates	the	temptation	to	choose	the	particular	bifurcation	whose	results	happen	to	
be	consistent	with	the	theory.	Finally,	we	should	reiterate	that	(1)	we	are	using	neoclassical	
price	data	rather	than	(unavailable)	Marxist	labour	values,	so	what	we	see	in	these	charts	
might	have	nothing	do	with	Marx’s	theory	to	begin	with;	and	(2)	since	labour	values	remain	
unknown,	 there	 is	 no	 way	 to	 know	whether	 our	 findings	 support	 or	 undermine	 Marx’s	
theory.	
	 	
                                                            
8	Marxists	commonly	consider	utilities	as	a	productive	sector,	but	they	often	exclude	it	from	their	empirical	
analysis	due	to	data	problems.	We	follow	this	convention	here.	
9	 In	 their	 empirical	 analyses,	 some	Marxists	 do	 not	 follow	 this	 proper	method;	 instead,	 they	 approximate	
surplus	value	by	subtracting	the	wage	bill	from	the	income	not	of	all	sectors,	but	of	the	productive	sectors	only	
(see	for	example,	Carchedi	2011).	Because	this	computation	is	analytically	incorrect,	its	results	are	difficult	to	
interpret.	
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Surplus Value /
(Productive Assets + Productive Wages)(right)
Productive Assets / Productive Wages
(left)
Figure	8	
Refined	Marxist	Proxies	for	the	U.S.	Rate	of	Profit	and	
the	Organic	Composition	of	Capital	
1947‐2012	
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTE: Productive assets are estimated by the replacement cost of 
net fixed assets in agriculture, construction, mining and 
manufacturing. Productive wages are estimated by compensation of 
employees in agriculture, construction, mining and manufacturing. 
Surplus value is estimated by net domestic product less productive 
wages. The last data points are for 2012. 
 
SOURCE: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis through Global 
Insight (series codes: FAPNRM11, FAPNRM21, FAPCON and 
FAPM, for net fixed assets in agriculture, mining, construction and 
manufacturing, respectively; COMPDPNRM11, 
COMPDPNRM21, COMPDPCON and COMPDPM for 
compensation of employees in agriculture, mining, construction 
and manufacturing, respectively; NDP for net domestic product). 
	
	
The	Reserve	Army	of	the	Unemployed	and	the	Real	Wage	
	
Another	driver	of	crisis	in	Marx	is	the	relationship	between	the	reserve	army	of	unemployed	
and	the	real	wage.	For	Marx,	unemployment	is	the	regulatory	mechanism	that	ascertains	that	
wages	 gravitate	 toward	 their	 subsistence	 level.	 During	 a	 boom,	 the	 bargaining	 power	 of	
workers	strengthens,	so	the	real	wage	tends	to	rise	above	its	labour	value.	This	rise	squeezes	
profit,	causing	capitalists	to	invest	less.	A	crisis	then	ensues,	unemployment	rises,	and	the	
real	wage	is	compressed	back	to	subsistence.		
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(share of labour force, right)
(annaul rate of change, left)
Figure	9	
U.S.	Unemployment	and	‘Real’	Wage	Growth	
1930‐2014	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	 	
	
	
	
	
	
NOTE:	Series	are	shown	as	5‐year	trailing	averages.	The	‘real’	
wage	rate	is	the	nominal	hourly	wage	rate	divided	by	the	implicit	
GDP	deflator.	The	rate	of	change	of	the	‘real’	wage	concatenates	
the	rates	of	change	for	production	workers	in	manufacturing	until	
1952	and	for	workers	in	the	nonfarm	business	sector	afterwards.	
The	last	data	points	are	2013	for	the	‘real’	wage	rate	and	2014	for	
unemployment.	
	 	
SOURCE:	U.S.	Bureau	of	Economic	Analysis	through	Global	Insight	
(series	codes:	PDIGDP	for	the	implicit	GDP	deflator);	Historical	
Statistics	of	the	United	States,	Earliest	Times	to	the	Present:	
Millennial	Edition	(online)	(series	code:		
AllManufacturing_Hourly_Ba4361_Dollars	for	hourly	wages	of	
production	workers	in	manufacturing	[till	1938]);	U.S.	Bureau	of	
Economic	Analysis	through	Global	Insight	(series	codes:	
AHPMFNS	for	hourly	wages	of	production	workers	in	
manufacturing,	computed	as	annual	averages	of	monthly	data	
[from	1939	onward];	JRWSSNFE	for	hourly	compensation	of	
employees	in	the	nonfarm	business	sector,	computed	as	annual	
averages	of	quarterly	data	[from	1947	onward]);	Historical	
Statistics	of	the	United	States,	Earliest	Times	to	the	Present:	
Millennial	Edition	(online)	(series	code:	
Unemployed_AsPercentageOf_CivilianLaborForce_Ba475_Percent	
for	the	unemployment	rate	[till	1947]);	U.S.	Bureau	of	Labor	
Statistics	through	Global	Insight	(series	code:	RUC	for	the	
unemployment	rate,	computed	as	annual	averages	of	monthly	
data	[1948	onward]).	
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Figure	9	examines	this	process	with	respect	to	the	United	States.	The	chart	shows	two	series.	
The	 rate	 of	 unemployment,	 represented	 by	 the	 dashed	 line,	 is	 plotted	 against	 the	 right	
logarithmic	scale.	The	rate	of	change	of	the	real	wage	is	shown	by	the	solid	line	and	is	plotted	
against	the	left	inverted	scale.	The	inversion	means	that	a	downward	movement	of	this	series	
in	the	chart	represents	a	rise	in	the	rate	of	growth	of	the	real	wage.	Note	that	both	series	are	
smoothed	as	5‐year	trailing	averages.	
	
This	relationship,	which	does	not	depend	on	knowing	labour	values,	seems	consistent	with	
the	spirit	of	Marx’s	claims	and	looks	highly	robust.	Whenever	unemployment	rises,	the	rate	
of	change	of	the	real	wage	falls	–	and	vice	versa	when	unemployment	falls.	Both	series	show	
a	significant	change	in	the	run‐up	to	the	current	crisis:	unemployment	fell	since	the	early	
1980s,	 and	 particularly	 during	 the	 1990s,	 while	 the	 rate	 of	 change	 of	 the	 real	 wage	
accelerated	in	tandem	with	this	fall.	In	light	of	these	developments,	the	crisis	of	the	2000s	
could	 be	 interpreted,	 at	 least	 in	part,	 as	 a	 classical	Marxist	 backlash	 set	 in	motion	 to	 rid	
capitalists	of	excessive	wages	squeezing	their	profit.	And	indeed,	since	the	onset	of	the	crisis,	
the	 rate	 of	 unemployment	 has	 soared	 and	 the	 rate	 of	 growth	 of	 the	 real	wage	 has	 been	
reduced	to	a	standstill.	Whether	this	process	is	the	principal	driver	of	the	crisis	of	course	is	
hard	to	tell,	but	it	is	certainly	consistent	with	it.		
	
But	 the	 connection	 to	 Marx’s	 theory	 here,	 although	 intuitively	 appealing,	 is	 ultimately	
misleading.	For	Marx,	the	significance	of	the	reserve	army	lies	in	its	impact	not	on	the	rate	of	
change	of	the	real	wage,	but	on	its	absolute	level.	Figure	10	examines	this	latter	impact,	and	
the	picture	 it	 depicts	 is	 very	different	 from	 that	of	 Figure	9.	The	 chart	 shows	 the	 rate	of	
unemployment	against	the	right	log	scale	and	the	real	wage	level	against	the	left	log	scale.	
We	use	 two	 real‐wage	 series	–	 for	production	workers	 in	manufacturing	only	and	 for	all	
workers	in	the	nonfarm	business	sector.	Both	series	are	expressed	as	indices.		
	
Unlike	Figure	9,	this	chart	seems	to	present	an	anomaly.	We	can	see	that,	as	Marx	might	have	
expected,	the	level	of	real	wages	moved	inversely	with	unemployment	till	the	early	1940s	–	
yet,	 from	 then	 onward,	 the	 relationship	 inverted.	 Unemployment	 started	 to	 rise	 and	
continued	 to	 do	 so	 till	 the	 early	 1980s;	 but	 the	 real	 wage,	 instead	 of	 falling	 or	 at	 least	
stagnating,	 rose	 in	 tandem.	Moreover,	when	 unemployment	 stopped	 rising	 and	 even	 fell	
during	the	1990s,	the	real	wage,	instead	of	rising,	stagnated.	From	this	viewpoint,	the	reserve	
army	of	 the	 unemployed	no	 longer	 seems	 to	 play	 the	 role	 that	Marx	 allotted	 to	 it	 in	 the	
nineteenth	century,	at	least	not	in	any	evident	way.	Compared	to	the	earlier	postwar	era,	the	
real	wage	during	the	1990s	and	2000s	has	hardly	changed,	so	it	is	difficult	to	see	it	as	a	‘profit	
squeezing’	factor	underlying	the	current	crisis.	
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(share of labour force, right)
(manufacturing, left)
(nonfarm business, left)
Figure	10	
U.S.	Unemployment	and	the	‘Real’	Wage	Rate	
1920‐2013	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	 	
	
	
	
	
	
NOTE:	The	‘real’	hourly	wage	is	the	nominal	hourly	wage	rate	
divided	by	the	implicit	GDP	deflator	and	expressed	as	an	index.	The	
last	data	points	are	2013	for	‘real’	hourly	wage	(nonfarm	business)	
and	2014	for	‘real’	hourly	wage	(manufacturing)	and	
unemployment.	
	 	
SOURCE:	U.S.	Bureau	of	Economic	Analysis	through	Global	Insight	
(series	codes:	PDIGDP	for	the	implicit	GDP	deflator);	Historical	
Statistics	of	the	United	States,	Earliest	Times	to	the	Present:	
Millennial	Edition	(online)	(series	code:		
AllManufacturing_Hourly_Ba4361_Dollars	for	hourly	wages	of	
production	workers	in	manufacturing	[till	1938]);	U.S.	Bureau	of	
Economic	Analysis	through	Global	Insight	(series	codes:	AHPMFNS	
for	hourly	wages	of	production	workers	in	manufacturing,	
computed	as	annual	averages	of	monthly	data	[from	1939	
onward];	JRWSSNFE	for	hourly	compensation	of	employees	in	the	
nonfarm	business	sector,	computed	as	annual	averages	of	
quarterly	data	[from	1947	onward]);	Historical	Statistics	of	the	
United	States,	Earliest	Times	to	the	Present:	Millennial	Edition	
(online)	(series	code:	
Unemployed_AsPercentageOf_CivilianLaborForce_Ba475_Percent	
for	the	unemployment	rate	[till	1947]);	U.S.	Bureau	of	Labor	
Statistics	through	Global	Insight	(series	code:	RUC	for	the	
unemployment	rate,	computed	as	annual	averages	of	monthly	data	
[1948	onward]).	
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Underconsumption	
	
The	 third	 Marxist	 driver	 of	 crisis	 is	 underconsumption.	 Unlike	 the	 theory	 of	 the	 falling	
tendency	of	the	rate	of	profit,	which	emphasizes	the	limits	on	the	production	of	surplus	value,	
underconsumption	 deals	with	 the	 limits	 on	 the	 realization	 of	 surplus	 value.	 The	 starting	
point	is	the	more	or	less	universal	fact	that	workers,	because	of	their	lower	income,	spend	
most	if	not	all	of	that	income	on	consumption.	By	contrast,	capitalists,	whose	income	is	much	
higher,	can	afford	–	and	are	compelled	by	their	social	role	as	capitalists	–	to	save	most	of	it.	
So,	 all	 else	 remaining	 the	 same,	 an	 upward	 redistribution	 of	 income	 from	 workers	 to	
capitalists	will	tend	to	reduce	the	average	share	of	consumption	in	aggregate	spending.	The	
consequence	 of	 this	 reduction,	 say	 the	 underconsumptionists,	 is	 a	 glut	 of	 unsold	
commodities,	 lower	 prices	 and	 lower	 profit.	 And	 since	 falling	 profit	 tends	 to	 lower	
investment	spending,	we	end	up	with	a	generalized	‘realization	crisis’.	
	
Until	 the	early	twentieth	century,	 this	view	was	not	particularly	popular	among	Marxists,	
partly	because	Marx	himself	seemed	rather	ambivalent	about	 it.	But	the	rise	of	European	
imperialism	in	the	latter	half	of	the	nineteenth	century,	the	Great	Depression	of	the	1930s,	
and	the	militarized	boom	of	 the	Second	World	War	changed	this	attitude.	Following	 John	
Hobson’s	pioneering	work	on	Imperialism	(1902),	Marxists	started	to	seriously	contemplate	
the	 significance	 of	 realization	 for	 capitalist	 crisis	 (Hilferding	 1910;	 Luxemburg	 1913;	
Kautsky	 1914;	 Lenin	 1917).	 And	 with	 Keynes’	 emphasis	 on	 deficient	 demand,	 Marxist	
underconsumption	theories	enjoyed	a	significant	revival	(for	a	critical	analysis,	see	Bichler	
and	Nitzan	2012c).		
	
The	most	innovative	contributor	to	this	literature	was	the	Polish	political	economist	Michal	
Kalecki	(for	a	posthumous	edited	collection,	see	Kalecki	1971).	Writing	in	the	early	1930s,	
Kalecki	developed	a	class‐based	micro‐macro	model	that	anticipated	and,	in	some	important	
sense,	went	beyond	Keynes.	One	of	the	key	novelties	of	Kalecki’s	model	was	the	role	played	
by	the	market	structure	and	the	consequences	of	that	structure	for	the	distribution	of	income	
and	the	level	of	aggregate	demand	(Kalecki	1933,	1939,	1943;	Asimakopulos	1975,	1987).	
According	 to	 Kalecki,	 modern	 corporate	 structures	 tend	 to	 be	 highly	 concentrated.	 The	
extent	of	this	concentration,	he	said,	can	be	measured	by	the	‘degree	of	monopoly’,	which	he	
defined	as	(approximately)	equal	to	the	ratio	of	unit	profit	to	unit	price,	or	the	share	of	capital	
in	national	income.	All	else	being	the	same,	he	said,	the	higher	the	degree	of	monopoly	–	and	
therefore	 the	 higher	 the	 income	 share	 of	 capital	 –	 the	 lower	 the	 average	 share	 of	
consumption	in	aggregate	spending,	and	hence	the	greater	the	tendency	toward	deficient	
demand	and	stagnation.		
	
Later	 on,	 this	 insight	 became	 a	 key	 theoretical	 basis	 for	 the	 Monopoly	 Capital	 School.	
According	to	this	school	–	led	by	Paul	Baran	and	Paul	Sweezy	and	others	associated	with	the	
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journal	Monthly	Review	 –	oligopolistic	 capitalism	 tends	 to	generate	 stagflation	and	needs	
wasteful	spending	–	particularly	military	expenditures	and	financialization	–	to	offset	this	
tendency	(Steindl	1952;	Tsuru	1956;	Baran	and	Sweezy	1966;	Magdoff	and	Sweezy	1983;	
Foster	and	Szlajfer	1984).		
	
Kalecki’s	argument	can	be	generalized	beyond	its	original	emphasis	on	capital	versus	labour.	
If	 the	share	of	 consumption	 in	personal	 income	 is	associated	negatively	with	 the	 level	of	
personal	 income,	 then	 we	 should	 expect	 personal	 or	 household	 income	 inequality,	
regardless	of	its	source,	to	be	inversely	correlated	with	the	pace	of	economic	activity.		
	
Figure	11	examines	 this	proposition	 for	 the	United	States.	The	dotted	 line	 at	 the	bottom	
shows	the	income	share	of	the	top	1	per	cent	of	the	U.S.	population	(for	a	comparative	critical	
assessment	of	income‐distribution	data,	see	Burkhauser	et	al.	2012).	The	solid	series	at	the	
top	 of	 the	 chart	 depicts	 the	 pace	 of	 economic	 activity,	 approximated	 here	 by	 the	 rate	 of	
growth	of	employment.	Note	that	we	use	employment	growth	rather	than	overall	economic	
growth.	The	reason	is	that,	as	it	is	commonly	measured,	overall	growth	is	affected	by	both	
employment	 and	 productivity	 growth,	 but	 only	 the	 former	 responds	 directly	 to	
underconsumption.	Both	series	are	smoothed	as	10‐year	trailing	averages.	
	
The	 relationship	 shown	 in	 the	 figure	 is	 rather	 remarkable.	We	 can	discern	 three	distinct	
periods,	 indicated	by	the	dashed,	 freely	drawn	line	going	through	the	employment	series.	
The	 first	 period,	 from	 the	 turn	 of	 the	 century	 till	 the	 1930s,	 is	 the	 so‐called	 Gilded	 Age.	
Income	 inequality	 is	 rising	 (at	 least	 during	 the	 period	 for	which	 data	 are	 available)	 and	
employment	growth	is	plummeting.		
	
The	 second	 period,	 from	 the	 Great	 Depression	 till	 the	 early	 1980s,	 is	 marked	 by	 the	
Keynesian	 welfare‐warfare	 state.	 Higher	 taxation	 and	 spending	 make	 distribution	 more	
equal,	while	employment	growth	accelerates.	Note	the	massive	acceleration	of	employment	
growth	during	the	Second	World	War	and	its	subsequent	deceleration	brought	by	postwar	
demobilization.	Obviously	 these	dramatic	movements	are	unrelated	 to	 income	inequality,	
but	they	do	not	alter	the	series’	overall	upward	trend.		
	
The	third	period,	from	the	early	1980s	to	the	present,	is	marked	by	neoliberalism.	In	this	
period,	 monetarism	 assumes	 the	 commanding	 heights,	 inequality	 starts	 to	 soar,	 and	
employment	growth	plummets.	The	current	rate	of	employment	growth	hovers	around	zero	
while	 the	 top	1	per	cent	appropriates	20	per	cent	of	all	 income	–	similar	 to	 the	numbers	
recorded	during	the	Great	Depression.		
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(annual rate of change, left)
(level, right)
Figure	11	
U.S.	Income	Distribution	and	Employment	Growth	
1900‐2014	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	 	
	
	
	
	
	
NOTE:	Series	show	annual	data	smoothed	as	10‐year	trailing	
averages.	The	trend	dashed	lines	going	through	the	employment	
growth	series	are	drawn	freehand.	The	income	share	of	the	top	
1%	is	inclusive	of	capital	gains.	The	last	data	points	are	2012	for	
the	income	share	of	the	top	1%	and	2014	for	employment	
growth.		
	
SOURCE:	Historical	Statistics	of	the	United	States,	Earliest	Times	
to	the	Present:	Millennial	Edition	(online)	(series	code:	
CivilianLaborForce_Employed_Total_Ba471_Thousand	for	
employment	[till	1947]);	U.S.	Bureau	of	Labor	Statistics	through	
Global	Insight	(series	code:	ENS	for	employment,	computed	as	
annual	averages	of	monthly	data	[1948	onward]);	The	World	
Top	Incomes	Database	at	http://topincomes.g‐
mond.parisschoolofeconomics.eu/	for	the	income	share	of	the	
top	1%.		
	
	
Figure	 11	 certainly	 seems	 consistent	 with	 the	 Monopoly	 Capital	 version	 of	
underconsumption.	 It	 suggests	 that	 the	 current	 crisis	 is	 the	 culmination	 of	 a	 systemic	
increase	in	inequality	that	began	in	the	early	1980s,	which	in	turn	bred	underconsumption	
tendencies	 and	 lowered	 employment	 growth	 to	 a	 standstill	 (for	 a	 survey	 of	 debates	 and	
evidence	on	the	role	of	income	inequality	in	the	recent	crisis,	see	van	Treeck	and	Sturn	2012;	
on	wage‐led	growth,	see	Lavoie	and	Stockhammer	2013).		
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For	the	underconsumptionists,	getting	out	of	this	crisis	now	depends	on	what	happens	to	
inequality.	If	the	distribution	of	income	can	be	made	more	equal	–	as	it	was	after	the	Great	
Depression	–	a	new	phase	of	growth	may	ensue.	But	if	increasing	inequality	is	inherent	to	
the	present	logic	of	capital	–	for	example,	because	of	the	drive	toward	greater	exploitation	
or	the	imperative	of	higher	concentration	and	centralization	–	then	the	crisis	may	be	difficult	
if	not	impossible	to	resolve.		
	
Note,	 though,	 that	 for	 the	 underconsptionists,	 accumulation	 and	 redistribution	 are	 two	
distinct	processes.	The	goal	is	accumulation	–	or,	in	this	case,	averting	an	accumulation	crisis	
–	while	redistribution	is	merely	the	means	for	achieving	that	goal.	But	then,	what	exactly	do	
we	mean	by	crisis?	So	far,	we	have	treated	this	concept	as	if	it	were	self‐evident	–	but	is	it?	
	
The	Common	Economic	Underpinnings	of	Marxism	and	Liberalism		
	
For	 Marxists	 as	 well	 as	 mainstream	 liberal	 economists,	 the	 engine	 of	 capitalism	 is	 the	
economy,	and	specifically	the	accumulation	of	capital	and	the	growth	of	GDP.	Accumulation	
and	growth	are	seen	as	two	sides	of	the	same	process.	Accumulation	generates	growth,	and	
growth	sustains	accumulation.	Both	are	thought	of	as	‘economic’	processes,	denominated	in	
‘real’	terms	of	production	and	consumption.	From	this	viewpoint,	crisis	is	a	breakdown	of	
both	real	accumulation	and	growth.		
	
And	that	is	what	we	see	in	Figure	12.	The	bottom	panel	of	the	figure	shows	the	level	of	the	
U.S.	real	capital	stock	and	GDP	since	1929,	while	the	top	panel	shows	their	respective	rates	
of	growth	smoothed	as	5‐year	trailing	averages.	Both	the	levels	and	rates	of	change	of	the	
two	magnitudes	move	in	tandem.	And	if	we	take	the	top	panel	at	face	value,	our	conclusion	
would	be	that	the	current	crisis	comes	at	the	tail	end	of	a	prolonged	deceleration	that	began	
in	the	late	1960s	and	has	recently	culminated	in	a	near	breakdown.		
	
Considered	 in	 conjunction	with	 evidence	 shown	 earlier	 in	 the	 paper,	 this	 process	 seems	
consistent	with	 the	Marxist	 claim	 that	 accumulation	 rests	 on	 class	 conflict,	 and	 that	 this	
conflict	makes	capitalism	prone	to	crisis.	But	if	we	examine	Figure	13,	we	can	also	see	that,	
in	terms	of	their	so‐called	real	incomes,	the	fate	of	both	capitalists	and	workers	goes	hand	in	
hand	with	the	economy.	The	chart	shows	the	levels	and	rates	of	growth	of	real	labour	income	
and	real	capitalist	income	(pretax	profit	and	net	interest),	and	both	trace	the	level	of	real	
GDP	and	oscillate	in	tandem	with	its	rate	of	growth.	
	
In	 this	very	basic	sense,	 then,	Marxists	and	 liberal	economists	sit	on	the	same	side	of	 the	
fence.	 In	 both	 perspectives,	 the	material	 interests	 of	 capitalists	 and	workers	 depend	 on	
economic	growth	and	capital	accumulation,	and	if	this	twin	engine	fails,	as	it	does	during	a	
crisis,	both	classes	lose.		
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5-year moving average
(left)
(right)
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1950=100
Figure	12	
‘Real’	Accumulation	and	Economic	Growth	
1925‐2013	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	 	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
NOTE:	Fixed	assets	are	chain‐type	quantity	indices	of	the	net	
stock	of	private	and	government	residential	and	non‐residential	
assets	(excluding	consumer	durables).	GDP	is	a	chain‐type	
quantity	index.	The	last	data	points	are	2012	for	fixed	assets	and	
2013	for	GDP.		
	
SOURCE:	U.S.	Bureau	of	Economic	Analysis	through	Global	Insight	
(series	codes:	JQFA	for	fixed	assets	and	JQGDPR	for	GDP).		
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5-year moving averages
www.bnarchives.net
1950=100
Figure	13	
‘Real’	GDP,	Capitalist	Income	and	Labour	Income	
1929‐2013	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	 	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
NOTE:	‘Real’	GDP	is	a	chain‐type	quantity	index.	Pretax	profit	and	
interest	and	compensation	of	employees	exclude	income	from	
the	rest	of	the	world.	‘Real’	income	measures	are	derived	by	
dividing	the	nominal	series	by	the	implicit	price	deflator.	The	last	
data	points	are	for	2013.	
	 	
SOURCE:	U.S.	Bureau	of	Economic	Analysis	through	Global	Insight	
(series	codes:	JQGDPR	for	GDP;	ZBECOND	for	domestic	pretax	
profit;	INTNETDBUS	for	domestic	interest	payments;	YDCOMP	
for	domestic	compensation	of	employees;	PDIGDP	for	the	implicit	
GDP	deflator).		
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The	difference	between	the	two	approaches	lies	in	the	reasons	they	give	for	the	crisis	and	
whether	 or	 not	 it	 can	 be	 averted.	 Mainstream	 economists	 root	 crises	 in	 imperfections,	
distortions	 and	misguided	 intervention	 that	 can	 be	 solved	 or	 counteracted	 by	 adequate	
policy	 (primarily	 deregulatory),	 whereas	 Marxists	 claim	 that	 crises	 are	 built	 into	 the	
conflictual	 class	 logic	 of	 capitalism	 and	 therefore	 are	 difficult	 to	 fix	 and	 impossible	 to	
eliminate.	But	both	agree	on	what	constitutes	a	crisis	in	the	first	place:	a	sharp	decline	in	real	
economic	activity	and	income.		
	
Capital	as	Power	
	
The	 theory	 of	 capital	 as	 power	 differs	 radically	 from	 both	 Marxism	 and	 mainstream	
economics	(Nitzan	and	Bichler	2009a;	Bichler	and	Nitzan	2012b).	Capital,	it	argues,	is	not	an	
economic	entity,	but	an	institution	of	power.	So,	at	its	core,	a	crisis	of	accumulation	is	not	a	
crisis	of	production	or	consumption,	but	a	crisis	of	capitalist	power	(Bichler	and	Nitzan	2010;	
Kliman,	Bichler,	and	Nitzan	2011;	Bichler	and	Nitzan	2012a).	
	
Now,	what	 do	we	mean	 by	 capitalist	 power?	 Following	 the	 explicitly	 scientific	 notion	 of	
power,	 first	 articulated	 by	 Johannes	 Kepler	 in	 1600,	 we	 see	 capitalist	 power	 not	 as	 a	
qualitative	 stand‐alone	 entity,	 but	 as	 a	 quantified	 relationship	 between	 entities.	 In	
capitalism,	 this	 quantitative	 relationship	 is	manifested	 through	 the	 distributional	 grid	 of	
incomes	 and	 assets	 between	 capitalist	 and	 non‐capitalist	 classes,	 as	 well	 as	 among	 the	
capitalists	themselves.	In	other	words,	for	capitalists,	redistribution	is	not	a	means	to	an	end,	
but	the	end	itself.		
	
Based	 on	 this	 notion,	 we	 suggested	 in	 the	 late	 1990s	 two	 tentative	 conditions	 for	 what	
constitutes	a	sustained	regime	of	accumulation	(Nitzan	1998).	The	first	and	key	condition	is	
non‐negative	differential	accumulation;	in	other	words,	that	the	capitalization	of	dominant	
capital	rises	or	at	least	remains	stable	relative	to	the	capitalization	of	the	average	firm.	This	
condition	reflects	both	the	power	drive	of	accumulation	as	well	as	the	necessity	to	exercise	
power	in	order	to	bring	society	under	effective	business	control.		
	
The	second	condition	is	a	steady	or	rising	capital	share	of	income.	This	condition	is	partly	an	
indirect	result	of	the	first	condition;	however,	it	also	reflects	the	overall	balance	of	power	
between	capitalists	and	other	societal	groups.	Unless	this	condition	is	fulfilled,	the	‘capitalist’	
nature	of	the	system	could	be	put	into	question.	
	
Within	this	context,	a	significant	violation	of	one	or	both	criteria	brings	the	threat	of	a	major	
capitalist	crisis.		
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Note	that	the	operational	definitions	of	these	two	conditions	are	open‐ended.	To	make	them	
precise,	 we	 need	 to	 clearly	 delineate	 capital	 income,	 define	 the	 boundaries	 of	 dominant	
capital	 and	 its	 referential	 average,	 and	 set	 the	 relevant	 time	 periods	 for	 computing	 the	
trajectories	of	 the	different	measures.	The	remainder	of	 this	section	presents	a	 tentative,	
broad‐brush	 approximation	 of	 these	 two	 power	 processes,	 examines	 their	 political‐
economic	underpinnings,	and	assesses	what	they	might	mean	for	policymaking	in	a	world	
where	capital	is	power.	
	
The	Evolution	of	Capitalist	Power	in	the	United	States	
	
Figure	14	examines	the	historical	evolution	of	our	two	criteria	in	the	United	States.	The	chart,	
which	revises	and	updates	research	that	we	first	presented	in	the	late	1990s	(Nitzan	1998),	
shows	two	comprehensive	measures	of	capitalist	income.	Capitalist	income	is	defined	here	
as	pretax	profit	and	net	interest	–	or	what	the	accountants	call	EBIT,	an	acronym	for	‘earnings	
before	interest	and	taxes’.		
	
Begin	with	the	top	dotted	series.	This	series,	plotted	against	the	left	arithmetic	scale,	shows	
the	share	of	pretax	profit	and	net	interest	in	overall	national	income.	The	unmistakable	trend	
of	 the	 series	 is	 up.	 Since	 1929,	 the	 relative	 power	 of	 capitalists,	measured	 here	 by	 their	
income	 share,	 has	 risen	 by	 one	 third	 –	 from	 roughly	 12	 per	 cent	 to	 about	 16	 per	 cent.	
Furthermore,	the	volatility	of	this	share,	indicated	by	the	gradual	convergence	of	the	top	and	
bottom	dashed	lines,	has	been	reduced	significantly.	And	if	we	take	volatility	as	a	proxy	for	
risk,	we	would	conclude	that	the	risk	facing	capitalists	has	declined	as	well.	
	
The	bottom	series,	plotted	against	the	right	log	scale,	shows	the	differential	capitalist	income	
of	the	largest	200	U.S.‐incorporated	firms	(we	use	income	rather	than	capitalization	here,	
since	the	latter	measure	is	unavailable	for	most	firms).	This	differential	shows	the	EBIT	of	
an	 average	 corporation	 in	 the	 top	 200	 group	 relative	 to	 the	 EBIT	 of	 an	 average	 U.S.	
corporation	and	is	calculated	in	three	steps:	(1)	by	computing	the	average	EBIT	of	the	largest	
200	firms;	(2)	by	computing	the	sum	of	pretax	profit	and	net	interest	for	the	average	U.S.	
corporation;	and	(3)	by	dividing	the	former	by	the	latter.		
	
Here	too	the	pattern	is	remarkable.	Since	we	are	using	a	 log	scale,	the	slope	of	the	line	is	
indicative	of	its	rate	of	change.	Overall,	the	differential	income	of	the	top	200	U.S.‐based	firms	
rose	from	about	1,000	in	the	early	1950s	to	nearly	18,000	by	the	mid	2000s,	representing	an	
average	annual	differential	accumulation	of	over	4.5	per	cent.	10		
	
                                                            
10	The	very	same	pattern,	although	less	steep,	is	depicted	by	the	differential	capital	income	of	the	top	0.01%	of	
domestically	incorporated	U.S.	firms.	For	further	analysis	of	this	latter	group,	see	Bichler	and	Nitzan	(2012a).	
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Pretax Profit and Net Interest
as a Share of National Income
(left)
Ratio of Pretax Profit and Net Interest per Firm
Top 200 Corporations / All Corporations
(right)
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Figure	14	
Capitalist	Income	Share	and	Differential	Capitalist	Income	
1929‐2013	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	 	
	
	
	
	
	
	 	
	
	
	
	
NOTE:	Aggregate	profit	is	pretax	and	includes	capital	consumption	
adjustment	(CCAdj)	and	inventory	valuation	adjustment	(IVA).	
Capitalist	income	for	the	top	200	firms,	ranked	by	market	value,	is	
estimated	by	EBIT	(earnings	before	interest	and	taxes).	The	top	
200	firms	are	selected	from	U.S.‐incorporated	firms	in	
Compustat’s	North	American	dataset	(excluding	firms	with	no	
assets,	those	reporting	no	EBIT,	and	duplicates).	Differential	
capitalist	income	is	the	average	EBIT	for	a	top‐200	corporation	
divided	by	the	average	pretax	profit	and	net	interest	per	
corporation.	The	numbers	next	to	the	bottom	series	denote	its	
respective	values	in	1980,	1982,	2007,	2009	and	2013.	The	last	
data	points	are	for	2013.	
	
SOURCE:	U.S.	Bureau	of	Economic	Analysis	through	Global	Insight	
(series	codes:	ZBECON	for	domestic	pre‐tax	profit	with	CCAdj	&	
IVA;	INTNETAMISC	for	net	interest;	YN	for	national	income);	The	
number	of	active	corporations	is	from	Historical	Statistics	of	the	
United	States,	Earliest	Times	to	the	Present:	Millennial	Edition	
(online)	(series	codes:	Ch13,	till	1989)	and	the	IRS	(for	1990‐
2011).	The	numbers	for	2012‐13	are	extrapolated	using	the	
average	growth	rate	for	2002‐2011	(1.3%).	Compustat	‘funda’	file	
through	WRDS	(series	codes	for	Compustat	companies:	EBIT	for	
earnings	before	income	and	taxes;	CSHO	for	number	of	
outstanding	shares;	PRCC_C	for	closing	share	price).	
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Note	that	as	we	move	from	viewing	capital	as	an	economic	entity	to	seeing	it	as	relationship	
of	power,	the	picture	inverts.	Whereas	economic	growth,	the	accumulation	of	so‐called	fixed	
assets	and	the	growth	of	real	labour	and	capital	income	have	all	decelerated	since	the	1960s,	
the	 differential	 power	 of	 capitalists	 in	 general	 and	 of	 dominant	 capital	 in	 particular	 has	
trended	upward.		
	
The	Two	Crises	of	Capital	as	Power	
	
The	increase	in	differential	capitalist	income	since	the	1950s	has	been	relatively	smooth	–	
with	two	exceptions:	two	brief	periods	in	which	dominant	capital	experienced	differential	
decumulation.	(1)	In	the	late	1970s,	differential	accumulation	started	to	decelerate,	and	by	
the	early	1980s,	it	suffered	a	deep,	15	per	cent	drop.	However,	with	Ronald	Reagan	in	the	
White	 House,	 monetarism	 back	 in	 the	 driver’s	 seat	 and	 neoliberalism	 in	 full	 swing,	 the	
increase	quickly	resumed	and	lasted	for	another	twenty	years.	(2)	During	the	early	2000s,	
the	process	 again	 started	 to	 slow	down,	 and	 in	2007	 there	was	a	marked	decline:	 in	 the	
following	two	years,	the	top	200	firms	saw	their	differential	income	drop	by	nearly	30	per	
cent;	and	although	the	differential	has	since	risen,	its	2013	level	is	still	15	per	cent	below	its	
historical	peak.		
	
The	late	2000s	episode	is	different	from	the	one	in	the	early	1980s	in	two	respects.	First,	in	
the	 1980s,	 while	 dominant	 capital	 was	 suffering	 differential	 decumulation,	 the	 share	 of	
capital	in	national	income	was	actually	rising.	By	contrast,	in	the	late	2000s,	both	differential	
accumulation	 and	 the	 capitalist	 share	 of	 income	were	 falling.	 Second,	 and	perhaps	much	
more	 ominously	 for	 capitalists,	 nowadays	 both	 measures	 of	 power	 are	 probably	 more	
difficult	to	increase	than	they	were	during	the	1980s.		
	
With	respect	to	differential	accumulation,	this	greater	difficulty	is	evident	from	the	mere	fact	
that	the	differential	EBIT	of	the	top	200	corporations	is	now	roughly	three	times	higher	than	
it	was	 in	the	1980s.	Pushing	this	magnitude	even	further	–	 let	alone	having	 it	grow	at	 its	
average	 historical	 rate	 of	 4.5%	 –	 will	 require	 an	 avalanche	 of	 mergers	 and	 acquisitions	
commensurate	with	 the	mammoth	 size	 of	 dominant	 capital	 and/or	 intense	measures	 to	
increase	differential	markups	more	and	more	–	an	already	 tall	order	 that	will	grow	even	
taller	with	every	further	increase	in	the	differential	size	of	dominant	capital	(on	strategies	
and	regimes	of	differential	accumulation,	see	Nitzan	2001;	Nitzan	and	Bichler	2009a:	Chs.	
15‐17).	
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Capital	as	Power	and	Strategic	Sabotage	
	
To	understand	the	limits	on	the	overall	share	of	capital	in	national	income,	we	turn	now	to	
the	two	 last	charts	of	 the	paper	–	Figures	15	and	16	(for	 the	earliest	presentation	of	 this	
relationship,	see	Nitzan	and	Bichler	2000;	 for	recent	commentary,	see	Bichler	and	Nitzan	
2014).	The	relationship	presented	in	these	figures	might	seem	counter‐intuitive	–	but	only	if	
you	 take	 your	 cue	 from	 the	 ‘economic’	 understanding	 of	 capitalism.	 If	 you	 look	 at	 these	
relationships	from	the	viewpoint	of	capital	as	power,	the	puzzle	quickly	disappears.		
	
Figure	 15	 shows	 the	 overall	 share	 of	 capital	 in	 domestic	 income	 along	 with	 the	 rate	 of	
unemployment.	The	top	panel	displays	the	levels	of	the	two	variables,	both	smoothed	as	5‐
year	trailing	averages.	The	solid	line,	plotted	against	the	left	log	scale,	shows	pretax	profit	
and	net	interest	as	a	percent	of	domestic	income.	The	dotted	line,	plotted	against	the	right	
log	scale,	shows	the	rate	of	unemployment	three	years	earlier.	The	bottom	panel	shows	the	
annual	rates	of	change	of	the	two	top	variables	since	1940.	
	
The	same	relationship	is	displayed,	somewhat	differently,	in	Figure	16.	This	chart	shows	the	
two	variables	from	Figure	15	for	the	1947‐2013	period	–	but	instead	of	plotting	them	against	
time,	it	plots	them	against	each	other	(for	an	analysis	of	the	entire	1929‐2013	period,	see	
Bichler	 and	Nitzan	 2014).	 The	 capitalist	 share	 of	 domestic	 income	 is	 plotted	 against	 the	
vertical	 axis,	 while	 the	 rate	 of	 unemployment	 three	 years	 earlier	 is	 plotted	 against	 the	
horizontal	axis.11		
	
The	direction	and	tightness	of	this	relationship	leave	little	to	the	imagination.	If	we	regress	
the	capitalist	share	of	domestic	income	against	the	rate	of	unemployment	three	years	earlier,	
we	find	that	for	every	1	per	cent	increase	in	unemployment,	there	is	0.8	per	cent	increase	in	
the	capitalist	share	of	domestic	income	three	years	later	(see	the	straight	OLS	regression	line	
going	through	the	observations).	The	R‐squared	of	the	regression	indicates	that,	between	
1947	and	2013	changes	in	the	unemployment	rate	accounted	for	82	per	cent	of	the	squared	
variations	of	capitalist	income	three	years	later.		
	
	 	
                                                            
11	The	three‐year	lag	between	changes	in	unemployment	and	changes	in	the	capitalist	income	share	suggests	
that	 the	 redistributional	 impact	 of	 the	 underlying	 sabotage	 is	 not	 immediate.	 The	 precise	mapping	 of	 this	
process,	though,	requires	further	investigation.	
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Three Years Earlier
(right)
Share of Domestic Income
(left)
www.bnarchives.net
Figure	15	
U.S.	Unemployment	and	the		
Domestic	Income	Share	of	Capital		
1920‐2014	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	 	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	 	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
NOTE:	Series	show	annual	data	smoothed	as	5‐year	trailing	
averages.	Profit	is	pre‐tax	and	includes	capital	consumption	
adjustment	(CCadj)	and	inventory	valuation	adjustment	(IVA).	
The	unemployment	rate	is	expressed	as	a	share	of	the	labour	
force.	The	last	data	points	are	2013	for	profit	and	interest	and	
2014	for	unemployment.	
	
SOURCE:	U.S.	Bureau	of	Economic	Analysis	through	Global	Insight	
(series	codes:	GDY	for	domestic	income;	ZBECOND	for	domestic	
pre‐tax	profit	with	CCAdj	&	IVA;	INTNETDBUS	for	domestic	net	
interest);	Historical	Statistics	of	the	United	States,	Earliest	Times	to	
the	Present:	Millennial	Edition	(online)	(series	code:	
Unemployed_AsPercentageOf_CivilianLaborForce_Ba475_Percent	
for	the	unemployment	rate	[till	1947]);	U.S.	Bureau	of	Labor	
Statistics	through	Global	Insight	(series	code:	RUC	for	the	
unemployment	rate,	computed	as	annual	averages	of	monthly	data	
[1948	onward]).	
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www.bnarchives.net
Figure	16	
U.S.	Unemployment	and	the	
Domestic	Income	Share	of	Capital		
1947‐2013	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	 	
	
	
	
	
	
NOTE:	Series	show	annual	data	smoothed	as	5‐year	trailing	
averages.	Profit	is	pre‐tax	and	includes	capital	consumption	
adjustment	(CCAdj)	and	inventory	valuation	adjustment	(IVA).	
The	unemployment	rate	is	expressed	as	a	share	of	the	labour	
force.	The	last	data	points	are	for	2013.	
	
SOURCE:	U.S.	Bureau	of	Economic	Analysis	through	Global	Insight	
(series	codes:	GDY	for	domestic	income;	ZBECOND	for	domestic	
pre‐tax	profit	with	CCAdj	&	IVA;	INTNETDBUS	for	domestic	net	
interest);	Historical	Statistics	of	the	United	States,	Earliest	Times	to	
the	Present:	Millennial	Edition	(online)	(series	code:	
Unemployed_AsPercentageOf_CivilianLaborForce_Ba475_Percent	
for	the	unemployment	rate	[till	1947]);	U.S.	Bureau	of	Labor	
Statistics	through	Global	Insight	(series	code:	RUC	for	the	
unemployment	rate,	computed	as	annual	averages	of	monthly	data	
[1948	onward]).	
	
	
Can	Capitalists	Afford	Recovery?	
	
What	do	Figures	15	and	16	tell	us?	From	the	viewpoint	of	both	mainstream	economics	and	
Marxism,	 the	 relationships	 in	 these	 figures	 are	 highly	 counterintuitive	 (the	 conventional	
view	is	that	the	capital	income	share	is	pro‐cyclical	–	see	Giammarioli	et	al.	2002;	Schneider	
2011	–	exactly	the	opposite	of	what	we	see	in	the	figures).	Because	accumulation	and	growth	
are	seen	as	two	sides	of	the	same	process,	unemployment	is	generally	viewed	as	a	curse	for	
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both	capitalists	and	workers.	As	noted,	Marx	was	prescient	in	identifying	the	role	of	rising	
unemployment	in	disciplining	workers	and	reducing	their	wages	back	to	their	labour	values.	
But	 this	 process	 is	 supposed	 to	 serve	 accumulation	 only	 for	 brief	 periods,	 particularly	
toward	 the	 peak	 of	 the	 business	 cycle.	 Over	 the	 longer	 haul,	 though,	 capitalists,	 just	 like	
workers,	 are	 interested	 in	 growth	 and	 therefore	 in	 low	 unemployment,	 not	 high	
unemployment.		
	
Figures	15	and	16	portray	a	completely	different	process,	with	wide‐ranging	implications.	
Here,	the	driving	force	of	capitalism	is	not	absolute	but	relative:	it	is	not	economic	growth	
and	the	accumulation	of	productive	machines	and	structures	that	count,	but	the	differential	
accumulation	 of	 capitalized	 power.	 Now,	 understood	 as	 a	 power	 process,	 differential	
accumulation	 requires	 strategic	 sabotage,	and	 this	 sabotage	 can	 take	different	 forms.	We	
have	 explored	 many	 of	 these	 forms	 in	 our	 previous	 works,	 and	 there	 are	 now	 young	
researchers	who	are	extending	this	inquiry	into	new	fields	and	regions.12	But	as	the	charts	
vividly	 illustrate,	 of	 these	 many	 processes	 of	 sabotage,	 the	 threat	 and	 exercise	 of	
unemployment	remains	central	and	crucial	–	not	only	temporarily	as	Marx	suggested,	but	
permanently.		
	
This	claim	has	significant	implications	for	economic	policy.	As	it	turns	out,	the	problem	of	
policymakers	is	not	only	that	their	dogma	has	collapsed	and	that	their	ammunition	has	run	
out,	but	also,	and	more	importantly,	that	their	very	policy	goal	is	self‐contradictory.	Capitalist	
policy	is	geared,	first	and	foremost,	toward	accumulation.	If	accumulation	recovers,	argue	
both	Marxists	and	liberals,	economic	growth	will	recover	in	tandem,	and	the	tide	of	growth	
will	then	help	lift	up	all	boats	–	including	those	of	workers	–	by	lowering	unemployment	and	
raising	the	real	wage.		
	
This	 logic,	 though,	 is	 premised	 on	 capital	 being	 a	 ‘real’	 economic	 entity.	 However,	 if	 we	
instead	think	of	capital	as	power,	 there	 is	no	way	 for	policymakers	 to	achieve	both	goals	
simultaneously,	 and	 for	 a	 simple	 reason:	 capitalists	 cannot	 afford	 recovery.	 In	 order	 for	
policymakers	to	boost	the	capitalist	share	of	income,	they	need	not	to	lower	unemployment,	
but	to	raise	it.	
	
                                                            
12	See,	for	example,	the	edited	volume	of	Tim	Di	Muzio	(2013)	on	the	capitalist	mode	of	power.	Other	works	
include	 Syed	 Ozair	 Ali	 (2011)	 on	 stagflation	 in	 Pakistan,	 Joseph	 Baines	 (2013)	 on	 food	 profit	 and	
malnourishment,	Jordan	Brennan	(2012)	on	dominant	capital	and	income	inequality	in	Canada,	D.T.	Cochrane	
and	Jeff	Monghan	(2013)	on	differential	accumulation	and	struggles	in	South	Africa’s	Apartheid,	Tim	Di	Muzio	
(2012)	 on	 the	 ecological	 limits	 of	 differential	 accumulation,	 Sandy	 Brian	 Hager	 (2013a,	 2013b)	 on	 the	
centralization	of	public	debt	ownership,	Joseph	Francis	(2013)	on	regimes	of	differential	accumulation	in	the	
United	 States	 and	 United	 Kingdom,	 Suhail	 Malik	 and	 Phillips	 Andrea	 (2012)	 on	 the	 art	 business,	 James	
McMahon	(2013)	on	Hollywood’s	risk	reduction	through	standardization	and	Hyeng‐Joon	Park	(2013b,	2013a)	
on	differential	accumulation	in	the	development	of	modern	South	Korea.	
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With	these	thoughts	in	mind,	the	final	question	to	ask	is	what	lies	ahead?	If	the	relationship	
depicted	 in	Figure	15	 continues	 to	hold,	 the	 share	of	 capitalists	 in	U.S.	 domestic	 income,	
expressed	as	a	five‐year	trailing	average,	is	set	to	rise	further	in	the	coming	years.	The	crisis	
has	 raised	 unemployment	 to	 its	 highest	 level	 since	 the	 1930s,	 so	 looking	 forward,	 this	
increase	in	strategic	sabotage	should	boost	the	power	of	capital	and	therefore	its	distributive	
share	of	income.		
	
But	capitalists	are	never	content	with	the	status	quo.	Their	regime	compels	them	to	augment	
their	 capitalized	power	 further	and	 further,	 and	 that	means	more	 strategic	 sabotage	and	
therefore	even	greater	unemployment.	And	it	is	this	need	for	ever	greater	sabotage	–	and	the	
risk	of	backlash	that	record	levels	of	sabotage	may	trigger	–	that	fuels	the	lingering	systemic	
fear	of	both	capitalists	and	their	policymakers.		
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